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CHAPTER 1 
AGAINST MORAL INTUITIONS 
Peter Singer’s Arguments Against The Use Of Moral Intuitions In Moral 
Methodology 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Every day we make judgments about morally appropriate and what is morally wrong. Often 
these judgments just seem to come to us, like immediate gut feelings. We may feel a strong, 
immediate repulsion and disgust if we see children torturing some animal. But do these gut 
feelings about what is appropriate and in appropriate, these moral intuitions, actually provide 
us with valid information about morality?  
According to philosopher Peter Singer, they don‘t.  
Peter Singer is possibly the most controversial currently living moral philosopher, having 
caused outrage among many due to his views on topics such as euthanasia, abortion, and 
animal rights. He is an outspoken preference utilitarian, arguing that the right thing to do in 
any situation is that action which would maximize preference satisfaction. He has spoken 
against devoting time and resources to topics in normative philosophy devoid of real practical 
consequences, believing that doing moral philosophy is to decide how we ought to live and 
should have real consequences as to how we lead our lives. He also tries living by his own 
moral tenets, having been arrested for demonstrating for the rights of animals, and he is 
known for donating 20% of his income to charities. 
The main aim of this thesis is to try to find out why Singer is against moral intuitions, looking 
at and trying to understand his arguments. And if we can‘t rely on our intuitions to tell us 
what‘s morally right from wrong, what other method of doing so do we have? 
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First I will be looking at the subjectivism argument against the use of intuitions, mainly 
focusing on the paper ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, published in 1973. In this 
paper he argues that the methodology of influential political philosopher John Rawls, dubbed 
reflective equilibrium, makes ethics subjective as it relies too heavily on actual human 
intuitions, as well as rebuking Rawls‘s claim that famed utilitarian 19th century philosopher 
Henry Sidgwick is a proponent for this method. The latter is of less interest for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
Then I will be looking at the evolution argument against intuitions, focusing on Singer‘s  
paper ―Ethics And Intuitions‖ from 2005. In this paper Singer wishes to show that recent 
research in neuroscience, combined with an evolutionary understanding of the history of the 
human species, gives us reasons to be sceptical of using intuitions in ethics. 
Then in the next chapter, I will be suggesting a third possible argument against intuitions, an 
argument which Singer has never made explicitly but which almost seems implicit in some of 
his work, and which may be tested empirically to some extent. This argument I call the 
partiality argument, arguing that intuitions are rooted in a form of partiality. 
Finally I will try to point out some of the possible consequences of Singer‘s rejection of 
intuitions in the light of our previous reflections. Here Singer‘s own moral methodology will 
be made explicit and demonstrated, the top-down methodology, serving as an option to 
relying on our moral intuitions. It will also be pointed out that intuitions may actually be 
morally helpful, but Singer‘s strong emphasis on reasoning could in theory pave way for 
paternalism and esoteric morality. 
A few notes need to be made before we proceed. First of all, when we are talking about 
whether or not we ought to use our moral intuitions, we are, in this thesis, referring to the 
methodological level as opposed to the practical level. Morality deals with the world as it is, 
including our intuitions, and these intuitions should certainly be taken into consideration 
together with all other empirical facts, when a moral theory is put into practice. In some cases, 
our intuitions may make it so that it will be impossible to fully implement a certain moral 
theory. But can the intuitions disprove the moral theory itself? So the relevant question is 
whether the fact that we have certain intuitions as to whether something is morally right or 
wrong proves that it in fact is morally right or wrong, and that any theory which goes against 
our intuitively based judgments must be invalid. 
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Whenever I talk of intuitions, and of right and of wrong, I will, unless otherwise is stated, be 
speaking of them in reference to morality. I will also not seek to define what morality is in 
this thesis, separating moral norms and oughts from other non-moral norms and oughts; that 
task would surely be a separate (and worthy) project in and of itself. Instead I will try to rely 
on our common of what morality is, and how the term is normally used in academic 
discussions. But to give a brief and tentative definition, morality is the question of how we 
ought to live our lives, in particular how we ought to conduct ourselves as members of a 
community consisting of other people similar to ourselves, and what duties (if any) we have 
to our fellow humans (or animals). 
I will also be using the words ethical and moral, and their variants, interchangeably 
throughout this thesis; they will all refer to the same basic concept. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ARGUMENT I: THE SUBJECTIVISM ARGUMENT 
“SIDGWICK AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM” 
 
 
“We cannot test a normative theory by the extent to which it accords with the moral 
judgments people ordinarily make.” 
Peter Singer, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the paper ―Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium‖ Singer sets out to show that philosopher 
Henry Sidgwick does not use political philosopher John Rawls‘s method of reflective 
equilibrium, as Rawls himself claims in his book A Theory of Justice
2
. However, Singer states 
that ―my concerns are not limited to refute a few peripheral sentences of A Theory Of 
Justice‖3, instead aiming to ask and reflect over a more fundamental question altogether, 
namely: what method of doing moral philosophy is the correct one? His conclusion in this 
paper is that Rawls starts with an outright incorrect account of what moral philosophy is 
about, in turn giving rise to an incorrect moral methodology, and that it would be preferable to 
use the method that Sidgwick favours. In this section my goal is to locate and in the process 
try to explain his argument against Rawls‘s method as phrased in ―Sidgwick and Reflective 
Equilibrium‖, which, as we shall see, amounts to an overall argument against the use of 
intuitions in ethics. 
                                                          
1
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 515. 
2
 Note that Peter Singer is using and quoting the first edition of A Theory Of Justice, not the revised edition. At 
the time, the revised edition had not yet been published. I will be quoting and referring to the revised edition. 
3
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 491. 
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Singer‘s paper consists of four sections (not counting the introduction), divided by Roman 
numerals. In section I Singer seeks to define Rawls‘ method of reflective equilibrium; in 
section II he looks at the evidence that Sidgwick also uses this method and refutes it; in 
section III he tries to make explicit what exactly Sidgwick‘s preferred method is; and in 
section IV, he concludes by comparing the two methods. It is in section I and IV where we 
can most clearly see his arguments against Rawls‘s methodology. Let us start by trying to 
define and explain Rawls‘s methodology, looking at both what Singer himself says and at  
excerpts from A Theory Of Justice. 
 
JOHN RAWLS‟S REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS 
Most people will have, under normal circumstances, a certain moral capacity, by which is 
meant the ability to judge something morally good or bad, or just or unjust.
4
 We are on a daily 
basis presented with situations that elicit this capacity, and examples of this are plenty. When 
watching the news we may find ourselves appalled when we hear about a certain violent 
episode, or we may find it less than fair when we hear of people getting offered jobs due to 
their social relations or their having a certain gender or race, or perhaps we‘re frustrated when 
a motorist has parked in a way we believe shows little consideration for others. People are not 
only highly social but highly judgmental creatures; most every day some people are the object 
of our judgment, as we judge whether their actions have been right or wrong with the greatest 
ease. 
This moral capacity serves as a starting point for Rawls‘s approach to moral philosophy, and 
it plays an important part in his moral methodology, dubbed reflective equilibrium. As he 
states in A Theory Of Justice: ―[O]ne may think of moral philosophy at first (and I stress the 
provisional nature of this view) as the attempt to describe our moral capacity‖5. However, for 
Rawls‘s reflective equilibrium, not all of our everyday moral judgments are relevant: only 
considered judgments are relevant. Considered judgments are, says Rawls, ―those judgments 
in which our moral capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion.‖6 So 
apparently what we are looking for are those judgments which best represent our undistorted 
moral capacity.  
                                                          
4
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 491. 
5
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 41. 
6
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 42. 
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As Singer puts it, this means that we must ―exclude judgments made without real confidence, 
or under stress, or when we may have been swayed by undue consideration of our own 
interests.‖7 So a snap judgment made in a heated situation is not a considered judgment, and 
one may not be able to make a considered judgment in a case involving the murder of one‘s 
child, to give a somewhat grisly example. Considered judgments are then judgments without 
any of the mentioned irregularities (and there may be other irregularities than those 
mentioned), and it is these that best represent our moral capacity. 
Looking at what has been said so far, is the correct moral theory or moral principles those 
which best match, or describe, our considered judgments? Not quite. Rawls admits, 
―considered judgments are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions despite the 
fact that they are rendered under favorable circumstances.‖8 Since these judgments are not 
perfect and may be distorted, we must be prepared to revise or discard certain considered 
judgments, as he goes on to explain:  
―When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice (one say, which 
embodies various natural and reasonable presumptions), he may well revise his judgments to conform to its 
principles even though the theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly. He is especially likely to do this 
if he can find an explanation for the deviations which undermine his confidence in his original judgments, 
and if the conception presented yields a judgment which he finds he can now accept.‖9 
He then goes on to introduce the idea of reflective equilibrium: 
―From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person‘s sense of justice is not the one which 
fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his 
judgments in reflective equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed 
various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast 
to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).‖10 
So Rawls‘s reflective equilibrium is both a process and a state we reach; the process consists 
of inspecting, revising and discarding our considered judgments and our moral principles in 
conjunction to one another, and the state is reached once we have a certain harmony – or 
equilibrium − between the two: our principles support our judgments and vice versa, and we 
have few if any situations in which they conflict with one another. These principles would 
then, presumably, be ―the best account of a person‘s sense of justice‖. The theory of 
                                                          
7
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 492. 
8
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 42. 
9
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 42-43. 
10
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 43. 
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utilitarianism could be one such principle to be tested against one‘s considered judgments. 
The utilitarian principle might seem intuitively appealing at first glance, but it is no great 
secret that strict, classical utilitarianism leads to a number of actions few would be willing to 
accept. The theory would, most likely, clash with enough of our considered judgments to be 
discarded, or the theory could be kept but revised into a considerably less strict form of 
utilitarianism – perhaps some form of rule utilitarianism. I say this with some confidence as 
Rawls uses much of A Theory Of Justice to discuss and combat the strict utilitarian principle, 
showing it to be incompatible with our considered judgments. 
Singer goes on to give the following explanation of Rawls‘s methodology of reflective 
equilibrium, comparing it to that of science:  
―Thus Rawls‘s view is that a normative theory is like a scientific theory. As in science, the aim of the theory 
is to explain all the data; but, also as in science, if a promising theory conflicts with only one or two 
observations, the observations may be jettisoned and the theory retained, rather than the other way around. In 
science this is achieved by introducing additional hypotheses, or assuming that an instrument was faulty, or 
some disturbance overlooked; in moral theory, what was previously thought to be a considered moral 
judgment may after all have been a result of distorted thinking, and so may be explained away. In both cases, 
although there are no ―brute‖ facts, there are facts, and the successful theory is the one that provides a 
plausible systematization of them.‖11 
So just as in science, a normative theory is to be tested against certain data, and if the data 
appears to go against the theory one can discard the theory, or revise the theory or add to it so 
that it matches the data, or put the data aside for now – the data may have been the result of 
some as of yet unknown distorting factors and the theory may perhaps be strongly supported 
by other data, so some minor discrepancies may be ignored. 
For example, imagine that we have a scientific theory stating that things fall downwards and 
not upwards.
12
 We may test the theory by letting objects fall from our hands: we may lift up a 
book, and then let it fall. It should fall to the ground, thus supporting our theory. However, 
what if we pick up a ball instead, and let it fall? It may bounce some after being dropped, 
actually not only going downwards but also upwards. Is this compatible with the theory? Or 
imagine dropping a feather, and a gust of wind catches it, raising it high up, carrying it out of 
our line of sight; as far as we can see, it never even hits the ground. These observations could 
lead us to discard the theory as faulty, now having some data which we may believe conflict 
                                                          
11
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 493. 
12
 I admit my ignorance when it comes to the natural sciences, so this should not be taken as good science. 
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with it. However, the theory may seem to be roughly right, matching much of our everyday 
experiences when it comes to falling items. So we may try to test the cases again in which the 
falling objects seem to defy the theory, trying to determine any factors that are present, and 
revising the theory in light of the new data we gather; ‗objects fall downwards, except when 
they have a certain structure and weight and a gust of wind of a certain strength hits the object 
at a certain angle‘. In the end we may end up with a more complex and accurate theory. 
An interesting question which Singer then asks is whether ―the fact that a moral theory 
matches a set of considered moral judgments in reflective equilibrium, to be regarded merely 
as evidence of the validity of a theory, or is it then to be valid by definition‖13. So if we have 
achieved reflective equilibrium, is the theory we then have simply the one which is the most 
likely to be correct, or does the fact that it has achieved an equilibrium with our considered 
judgments make it the correct theory by definition? Singer believes the latter to be correct, 
stating that ―Rawls has left no room for any idea of validity that is independent of achieving 
reflective equilibrium.‖14 A curious point, which Singer does not make, is that this appears 
quite unscientific, if science is the model we are to aim for in ethics if we use reflective 
equilibrium; in science, the fact that the theory matches our observations does not make the 
theory correct by definition, but only gives evidence for it and the theory may yet turn out to 
be false. 
But, what is the relation between considered judgments and intuitions? Considered judgments 
are something different than intuitions, but intuitions make up a part of them. We may 
intuitively feel that killing is wrong, and we may make a snap judgment based on this that 
killing indeed is wrong. This would then not be a considered judgment, but if we were to 
reflect over our intuitively made judgment under the ideal conditions for such endeavors, i.e. 
if we were to seriously and coolly consider it, we may end up with a fully considered 
judgment. This in turn is used to achieve reflective equilibrium and may end up as being one 
of the building blocks for a normative theory. So our initial, raw and impulsive intuitions 
may, in a way, provide leverage for or against a theory, but there are certain obstacles in the 
way (or more accurately, two: that of surviving being coolly considered, and thereafter that of 
surviving the process of reflective equilibrium) which, if it manages to get through them, may 
render the initial intuition into something unrecognizable when comparing it to the raw 
intuition we started out with.  
                                                          
13
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 493. 
14
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 493. 
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PETER SINGER‟S CRITICISM OF RAWLS‟S REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM – THE 
SUBJECTIVISM ARGUMENT 
Now that we have explained Rawls‘s methodology, let us look at Singer‘s criticism of this 
method. His most fundamental point against Rawls seems to be the following: 
―[…] Rawls is a subjectivist about morality in the most important sense of this often-misused term. That is, it 
follows from his views that the validity of a moral theory will vary according to whose considered moral 
judgments the theory is tested against.‖15 
And he immediately continues with the following elaboration of his claim: 
―There is no sense in which we can speak of a theory being objectively valid, no matter what considered 
moral judgments people happen to hold. If I live in one society, and accept one set of considered moral 
judgments, while you live in another society and hold a quite different set, very different moral theories may 
be ―valid‖ for each of us. There will then be no sense in which one of us is wrong and the other right.‖16 
Singer does not here give a definition of subjectivism independent of Rawls‘s theory, so it is 
initially difficult to fully grasp what is meant by subjectivist. A crude and well known form of 
subjectivism is to interpret all moral judgments as really being nothing but statements of one‘s 
own attitudes. According to this form of crude subjectivism, when you are making a claim 
like ‗Killing is wrong‘ you are really saying something akin to ‗I disapprove of killing‘. In 
other words, when you are making a moral judgment you are really just giving your personal 
opinion on the matter, and your judgments are to be interpreted as nothing more than 
statements of what you personally approve or disapprove of. 
This form of subjectivism runs into a problem which proves fatal for the theory. Let‘s say a 
certain person says just this, that ‗Killing is wrong‘, when another person comes along and 
says ‗Killing isn‘t wrong‘. The two persons, plainly, disagree on whether killing is or isn‘t 
wrong. Now, if we were subjectivists in the fashion just described, we would interpret the 
person saying ‗Killing is wrong‘ as really saying ‗I disapprove of killing‘ and the person 
saying ‗Killing isn‘t wrong‘ as really saying ‗I do not disapprove of killing‘. The result is that 
the two people no longer disagree, as the crude subjectivist interpretations of their moral 
judgments turn these judgments merely into claims about their attitudes; they aren‘t claims 
about whether killing is or isn‘t wrong, but simply claims about their own attitudes as to 
                                                          
15
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 494. 
16
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 494. 
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whether killing is or isn‘t wrong. In such a world there would be no real moral disagreements, 
but it is obvious that there really are moral disagreements and that such disagreements must 
be possible. From the standpoint of this form of subjectivism, no such disagreement could be 
possible. There are therefore few (if any) philosophers who subscribe to this form of 
subjectivism and it does not seem to be what Singer here is claiming Rawls to be, either.
17
 
Still, this has given us an idea of what subjectivism may entail. 
If we look at the first chapter of Singer‘s book Practical Ethics, he there devotes a few pages 
to the topic of subjectivism. This discussion is found under a section entitled ―What ethics is 
not‖, which is certainly a good indication that Singer believes subjectivism should be 
altogether avoided in ethics. Unfortunately his discussion of it is brief and vague and no clear 
definition of it is given, the closest being the following: ―[subjectivism] makes ethical 
judgments depend on the approval or disapproval of the person making the judgment[.]‖18 He 
then proceeds with briefly sketching and defeating the crude form of subjectivism, as we did 
above, before mentioning other philosophers who may be called subjectivists but who give 
more sophisticated and plausible accounts of how exactly moral judgments should be 
interpreted – specifically he mentions C. L. Stevenson, R. M. Hare, and J. L. Mackie. Though 
it is unclear whether Singer is saying that these philosophers are actually subjectivists or 
simply people who have interesting accounts on how moral judgments are to be interpreted 
and give viable options to crude subjectivism. (It is then difficult to see whether the stated 
definition is purely for crude subjectivism, or if it applies to most or all forms of subjectivism, 
including the case at hand, i.e. how the claim that Rawls is a subjectivist is to be interpreted.) 
Singer also contrasted subjective with objective: ―There is no sense in which we can speak of 
a theory being objectively valid‖ he said, and we may find some further clarification if we 
look to what is meant by objective. A philosophy dictionary gives it the following definition: 
―The belief that there are certain moral truths that would remain true whatever anyone or 
everyone thought or desired.‖19 So if we are objectivists in regards to ethics, whether killing is 
wrong does not depend on how I feel or think about the matter, what my attitudes are and 
whether I approve or disapprove; it‘s true or false independently of me as an individual. 
                                                          
17
 This was a rough sketch of the argument, and it leaves open the question as to what moral judgments really are 
and how moral disagreements arise and resolve. 
18
 Singer, Peter, Pratcical Ethics, p. 6. 
19
 A Dictionary Of Philosophy, p. 391. 
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The same dictionary does unfortunately not have an equally concise definition of what 
subjectivism entails. Philosopher Simon Blackburn however gives us the following brief 
definition of subjectivism from his book Ethics – A Very Short Introduction, saying that it 
enails ―that each individual has his or her own truth.‖20 Combined with the above quoted 
definition from Singer, that ―[subjectivism] makes ethical judgments depend on the approval 
or disapproval of the person making the judgment‖, and the above contrast to objectivism, an 
idea of what subjectivism is should be starting to form. If we are subjectivists in regards to 
ethics, our feelings and beliefs about killing may very well affect whether or not it‘s wrong. In 
a way, the measure of validity becomes internal if we take on a subjectivist stance; the claim 
that something is right or wrong must be measured against the subject itself making the claim. 
If we take on an objectivist stance instead, the measure of validity becomes external; whether 
or not something is right or wrong must be measured against something that is not relative to 
the individual. 
So if we are objectivists, there is a standard of right and wrong and what people believe or 
feel on the matter does not affect the standard. If we are subjectivists, what people think and 
feel matters and is what decides what right and wrong is. 
Many volumes have been written on the topics of objectivism and subjectivism, and there are 
many nuances and variants of these two stances. So it is not clear cut exactly what they refer 
to and entail, but the above rough sketch should give us an idea of what exactly we‘re dealing 
with here and what it is Singer is accusing Rawls of.  
So how exactly is Rawls a moral subjectivist? As stated, Rawls does not seem to adhere to 
crude subjectivism: moral judgments are claims as to what is actually right and wrong, and 
cannot be interpreted as ‗I approve / disapprove of…‘ statements. But let us see what Singer is 
saying here: ―it follows from [Rawls‘s] views that the validity of a moral theory will vary 
according to whose considered moral judgments the theory is tested against.‖21 As we have 
seen, the process of reflective equilibrium consists of testing our moral theory or principles 
against our considered judgments, which are judgments made under certain conditions in 
which they are not distorted, and the theory is to be revised or discarded in light of our 
considered judgments just as these considered judgments are to be revised or discarded in 
light of the theory. However, Singer is saying, considered judgments may vary from person to 
                                                          
20
 Blackburn, Simon, Ethics – A Very Short Introduction, p. 25. 
21
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 494. 
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person, and consequently may lead to different moral theories: ―If I live in one society, and 
accept one set of considered moral judgments, while you live in another society and hold a 
quite different set, very different moral theories may be ―valid‖ for each of us.‖22 
Given this, if the method we are to use in moral philosophy is that of reflective equilibrium, 
i.e. achieving a state in which our principles coincide with our considered judgments, it would 
seem possible to start with quite a preposterous set of considered judgments, and in turn end 
up with a state of equilibrium which may seem quite immoral to most people. It may be that 
brutish dictators and street thugs have a fine equilibrium, having managed to get their 
considered judgments to coincide with certain principles, but both their considered judgments 
and their principles are so that most would find them to be repugnant, recommending things 
most would say are clearly immoral, and which would be judged immoral according to most 
moral theories. But, if we are to interpret Rawls this way, such people would actually be quite 
moral indeed. 
If it seems implausible that someone could really achieve reflective equilibrium with plainly 
immoral considered judgments and principles, one could consider the possibility of 
brainwashing – an activity which specifically cults are infamous for subjecting people to (and 
perhaps, some may claim, various mainstream religions or religious organizations and 
institutions, the media, and even the governing body of a nation). Through brainwashing, 
could one not create such a plainly immoral reflective equilibrium in someone? Of course, the 
question remains as to what happens when such a person is presented with a certain moral 
theory which most find appealing, and is asked to consider it. Could one be convinced, or 
would the effect of the indoctrination prevail? But as presented, the method does not require 
us to be exposed to any specific moral theories for us to be able to achieve reflective 
equilibrium.  
Similarly, it may be claimed that we actually all have the same considered judgments (we 
may just need to be able to reflect over our judgments cooly enough), and so we would not 
really end up with two or more theories which would be equally valid. To this point, Singer 
gives the following reply:  
―Even if everyone shared the same considered moral judgment, this would only mean that a theory might 
have intersubjective validity: it would not make for objective validity. People might have judged differently, 
and then a different moral theory would have been ―valid‖.‖23  
                                                          
22
 Singer, Peter, ―Sidgwick And Reflective Equilibrium‖, p. 494. 
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As with subjectivism, he does not make it as explicit as to what he means by intersubjective to 
the extent we may have liked. In the above example, everyone have the same considered 
moral judgments – mine would be the same as yours – and the validity of a theory is here 
fixed to several persons rather than just one person. So for a theory to be intersubjectively 
valid, it must presumably be able to achieve reflective equilibrium with everyone. (Though I 
am unsure whether some form of consensus is needed for intersubjective validity, or if a 
majority would be sufficient.) It could be claimed – perhaps optimistically – that this would 
be the case if simply everyone thoroughly thought through their judgments and various moral 
theories. But even if this could be achieved, Rawls‘s method of reflective equilibrium still 
creates validity; whether or not we all believe it doesn‘t seem to matter. 
So, the standard which gives validity to a moral theory is still subjective, and it could have 
varied. However, this possible variation is not quite where the subjectivism seems to lie. The 
fact that two people can make conflicting moral judgments may seem to be the problem, but 
many utilitarians make conflicting moral judgments and presumably this does not mean that 
these utilitarians are subjectivists. For, it is not just that reflective equilibrium may result in 
different moral judgments and theories, but that these judgments and theories would all be 
equally valid, as stated above, and it might be here that the claimed subjectivism of the 
reflective equilibrium arises. 
But, one may ask, what if we were to interpret Rawls differently? What if we were to say that 
the method and process of reflective equilibrium merely gives evidence for the validity of a 
theory, but that the process does not itself make it valid? Would the theory still be 
subjectivist? It would still rely heavily on intuitions though, which Singer says may be 
remnants from ―discarded religious systems‖ or ―warped views of sex and bodily functions‖24  
and which could vary from person to person. In a way, it would then be subjectivist in regards 
to the evidence it accepts, using our intuitive moral judgments as data, but objectivist in that 
the actual validity is not decided by this evidence. In practice, however, it seems it would 
matter little as the same conclusion would be reached. 
It is difficult to say whether or not this theory would then still be subjectivist, but Singer 
points out the following: 
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―We have all been making moral judgments about particular cases for many years before we begin 
moral philosophy. Particular views have been inculcated into us by parents, teachers and society – 
telling the truth, not stealing when we have the opportunity to do so, and so on. These judgments sink 
deep, and become habitual.‖25 
So when we use our considered judgments as data, or our particular judgments of intuitions or 
common sense morality or what one wished to call it (which all are different from one another 
but all catch the same meaning that is relevant for this case), testing theories against them, 
then if a conflict arises odds are usually stacked against the theory. The theory must be 
discarded, and our indoctrinated norms prevail. It is difficult to see how any moral progress 
could be had if one used such a method, which I will have more to say about later in this 
chapter. 
 
HENRY SIDGWICK‟S AXIOMATIC METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS 
In part III of his paper, Singer seeks to explicitly explain what Sidgwick‘s method actually is. 
Sidgwick naturally enough gets mentioned throughout the paper though, and we find bits and 
pieces that shed light on his methodology throughout the other parts as well. The main aim of 
Singer‘s paper has been to showing how Sidgwick is not – and in part how he could be 
confused as – a supporter of any kind of reflective equilibrium model of ethics. So what 
exactly is the method that Sidgwick himself endorses, and what is it that makes a moral theory 
valid? Here Singer states: ―The short and simple answer is […] he is an intuitionist.‖26 
This may initially seem absurd after we have seen Singer‘s argument against Rawls and the 
use of intuitions qua considered judgments and the high regard Singer shows for Sidgwick 
throughout the text. Even in the concluding part of his paper, part IV, where he pits Rawls and 
Sidgwick more directly against one another, he lambastes Rawls for using intuitions. Let‘s try 
to see if and how this makes any sense. 
When trying to make explicit Sidgwick‘s method, Singer states: ―We begin with the search 
for ―real ethical axioms - intuitive propositions of real clearness and certainty‖ (ME, p. 
373)‖27. We are then looking for something that is self-evidently true, a proposition which 
neither requires nor can be given any further proof than the stating of the proposition itself, 
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which will serve as an axiom in our ethical theory. And in the concluding part of the paper 
Singer states that Sidgwick‘s method is to ―search for undeniable fundamental axioms; build 
up a moral theory from them‖28. What does this amount to? 
A good analogy is that of the famous 17
th
 century philosopher Reneé Descartes‘s famous 
treatise Meditations On First Philosophy in which he tries to arrive at what he can know with 
certainty. Everything he knows can be doubted, even the realness of the perceived world – it 
may be that he is just dreaming or that there‘s some evil entity distorting his mind. So 
everything is cast into doubt. But he cannot doubt the fact that he doubts, and when he doubts 
he is in fact thinking, and thinking cannot happen without the existence of the thinker. So he 
famously concludes: ―I am, I exist‖29, popularly re-stated as the Latin phrase cogito ergo sum, 
which roughly translates into English as ‗I think, therefore I am‘. Thus he has secured his own 
existence with a self-evident proposition, a statement he can‘t doubt no matter how hard he 
may try and which neither can nor need be supported by any further proof. He uses this as an 
axiom to help establish or deduce the existence of the rest of the world (though this part of the 
argument is more dubious); so he starts by discrediting everything he thought he knew, before 
finally arriving at some fixed point that remains, on which everything else must be based if 
we are to have some certainty in our knowledge. In a way, one is trying to find the smallest 
and purest building block possible, untainted by everything else, and which then must be used 
to build everything else. In the case of Descartes, what he was trying to build was certain or 
reliable knowledge – to be confident that circles really are round, that the objects we see 
really are there, etc. No small task. What moral philosophers seek is ‗merely‘ to arrive at 
certain or reliable knowledge regarding what is right and wrong, though our focus here is on 
how this is to be done – the method we are to use when doing ethics. 
We seem to be facing the same process with Sidgwick‘s method: to find out what is right and 
wrong we must find some moral axiom, some proposition which seems self-evident, and self-
evidence seems to be something one perceives or experiences intuitively, and hence why 
Sidgwick can be called an intuitionist. Such a principle is often referred to as a first principle, 
as it is the principle that all subsequent principles and all knowledge within the relevant field 
must be derived from. 
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As the method was just presented above in regards to Descartes, it may seem as if we‘re really 
looking for the axiom, a single self-evident first principle, but it is possible to find and operate 
with several equally valid first principles to serve as axioms within an ethical theory. 
Sidgwick himself arrives at three such axioms, according to Singer. The first of these Singer 
presents as an axiom of impartiality, namely that if we judge for something to be right in our 
own case we must also judge it to be right for all relevantly similar persons in all relevantly 
similar cases.
30
 The second is an axiom of prudence, which Singer says ―is the idea of 
impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life, so that we do not prefer a smaller present 
good to a greater future good, once any difference in the certainty of gaining the good has 
been taken into account.‖31 So we must aim at what is best for ourselves totally, and not just 
(for example) what is good for us temporarily in the present – drinking substantial amounts of 
alcohol is a good example of this, which may be ‗good‘ right now, but the future pain of a 
hangover and the possible economic loss and other bad consequences may outweigh this 
immediate good. The third and final axiom is another axiom of impartiality, stating that one 
must aim at good generally rather than a particular part of it as a rational agent.
32
 This means 
that one should not always aim at what is good for oneself rather than something that would 
be good for someone else; that is, one should not act selfishly. 
Singer does not go into detail as to how these axioms were arrived at or how they were argued 
for, but if they are to be self-evident then no such argument may be necessary. But are the 
above three proposed axioms really self-evident? The last axiom may seem the least 
convincing (or the least self-evident); why should we not only be concerned with and aim at 
our own good? But Singer briefly argues and clarifies that if we were to act so as if to only 
consider our own interest, our own good, we would not be acting morally; would we say that 
someone acting in such a fashion, only aiming at his own good, was acting morally? No, we 
would rather say that he was selfish.
33
 Both Singer and Sidgwick seem to admit that an 
essentially selfish person is a hard (if not impossible) nut to crack when it comes to 
motivating him to act morally, as he will not be convinced by any self-evident moral 
principles to change his behavior.
34
 Sidgwick‘s axioms as here presented aren‘t arguments for 
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morality per se, but rather principles within the sphere of morality; if we wish to be moral we 
must follow them, but if we have no such desire then they hold no real sway over our 
behavior, self-evident as they may be; knowing the rules to a game doesn‘t make it necessary 
that we actually choose to play the game.  
Now there are some obvious questions and difficulties which arise to such a method. Here I 
will address a few. 
One question is whether or not utilitarianism, both Sidgwick and Singer‘s normative theory of 
choice, is such a self-evident moral axiom or if it is merely supported by such axioms. Are 
actual moral theories themselves axioms, or do the theories consist of one or more axioms? In 
the concluding chapter of the paper, Singer states that Sidgwick‘s method is to ―search for 
undeniable fundamental axioms; build up a moral theory from them‖35, so it seems the latter 
would be the case. However, it depends on how one defines a moral theory: can a single 
principle, such as the greatest happiness principle, be considered a moral theory; or does one 
mean by moral theory some larger account detailing things such as practical application and 
implications, possible sub-principles deduced from the axioms and how they interact, how the 
moral axioms themselves are to be interpreted, and so forth? If moral theories were reducible 
to nothing more than a handful of intuitively self-evident propositions, works on moral 
philosophy would be awfully short. There are many kinds of utilitarianism, act utilitarianism 
and rule utilitarianism being well known variations, and they all operate with the greatest 
happiness principle as the core. 
Another question is how we can know whether or not a proposed moral axiom really is 
correct – may we not be mistaken, even if it seems at the time to be self-evident and un-
doubtable? Indeed we can, and one such check against error is what is here referred to as 
common sense morality, meaning the sum of our overall everyday judgments and norms –
what most of us feel and believe is right and wrong. Singer states:  
―Sidgwick had a great deal of respect for common sense morality. He refers to it as ―a marvelous 
product of nature, the result of long centuries of growth.‖ At the same time, Sidgwick was sufficiently 
skeptical of his own primary method of testing the truth of moral theories – which was, as we shall see, 
based on the alleged self-evidence of certain ethical axioms – to realize it was fallible. Accordingly, he 
looked to common sense morality as a safeguard against error. If an apparently self-evident moral 
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principle has consequences at odds with common sense morality, this should be a warning to us that we 
may be mistaken in our intuition of self-evidence.‖36 
This does seem a bit odd, given what has already been mentioned; for exactly why should we 
rely on such everyday intuitions that undoubtedly make up much of common sense morality? 
Especially since, as we have seen, these are likely to be a product of ―discarded religious 
systems‖ or other apparently outdated and irrelevant views. Singer provides us with a lengthy 
Sidgwick quote from an article published in 1879 entitled ―The Establishment Of Ethical First 
Principles‖, where this is somewhat, but perhaps not satisfyingly, clarified. Here is an excerpt 
of this quote, where Sidgwick explains why common sense morality should be appealed to 
when using his axiomatic method: ―it […] excludes all such error as arises from the special 
weaknesses and biases of individual minds, or of particular sections of the human race.‖37 
So by looking to how people ordinarily judge, it may help counteract any possible weaknesses 
and biases we may have. (It is tempting to compare it to a library, the common sense morality 
being a collection of books we may utilize to fill any gaps in knowledge we may have.) It is 
still difficult to see how this would work. Presumably we may learn new facts, be exposed to 
new perspectives and principles by tapping this resource, which in turn may affect our 
intuition about the self-evidence of a proposed self-evident moral axiom. But could not also 
the effect be a negative one, for example making us doubt a proposed self-evident moral 
axiom which is actually true? Or the effect could be nil, not changing our views or feelings in 
regards to the principle – which would be bad if it turned out to be false, and good if it turned 
out to be correct. 
One way to solve this would be to simply claim that if the principle really is true, then no 
matter how far we dip into the pool of common sense morality, our belief in the principle will 
remain. If our belief in the principle disappears after we resurface, we can simply conclude 
with certainty that it was no real moral principle. 
A more fundamental question though, is how we are to find these moral principles which are 
to serve as our axioms in the first place. No definite answer seems to be given here, other than 
simply thinking – using one‘s rationality and thinking critically – which may not be as helpful 
an answer as we would have liked. It doesn‘t seem impossible that some amount of luck is 
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involved as well in finding these first principles, as we may accidentally stumble over them 
when reflecting, which doesn‘t sound like an appealing way to do moral philosophy. 
But Sidgwick now seems strikingly similar to Rawls: we have certain principles which we 
make our axioms, and they are to be tested against our judgments, i.e. our common sense 
morality. One difference is certainly the notion of considered judgments, which might exclude 
much of what is to be found in common sense morality, but more importantly is the question 
of validity, as Singer explains: 
 ―Common sense morality, representing as it does the accumulated experience of mankind, is a useful 
check on our intuitions of self-evident moral axioms; but even when it is in harmony with our own 
intuitions we may after all be mistaken. It is this possibility […] that marks the distinction between the 
two authors – for on Rawls‘s view, one could not even make sense of such a possibility. For Rawls, 
reaching this kind of harmony is the goal of moral philosophy; it is the definition of ―valid‖ as far as 
moral theories are concerned; for Sidgwick, it is the best possible insurance against error, but because 
our target is a moral theory that is true, and not merely in harmony with out intuitions and with common 
sense morality, we may still be in error.‖38 
So one of the main differences between the two seems to be their views on moral validity: 
according to Rawls (or at least Singer‘s reading of him), the outcome of the method of 
reflective equilibrium is a moral theory that is necessarily valid. The outcome of Sidgwick‘s 
method, however, is a theory that aims at validity, but may or may not be valid. 
So now we‘re instead left with a striking difference between the methods of Rawls and 
Sidgwick as presented here which I wish to make explicit. According to Sidgwick‘s method 
we may always be wrong in our moral judgments; it may be that our moral axioms aren‘t 
valid first principles after all, or that there are other first principles which in effect could lead 
to a different moral theory and therefore different moral judgments, and so forth. But when 
we use Rawls‘s method, we are always right in our moral judgments. By harmonizing our 
considered judgments with our principles, what we achieve is a valid moral theory. It may 
later change as we are exposed to certain principles or as certain judgments arise, in which 
case we need to go back and forth again between our considered judgments and our principles 
until equilibrium is reached. But, it does not seem, at least not from our discussion of the 
method, that this equilibrium is any more or less valid than the previously achieved 
equilibrium was. There is then no real moral progress to speak of, only moral change. This 
would be unlike Sidgwick‘s method, in which our goal is to get closer to that which is truly 
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moral and any theory which is closer to this is more valid or closer to being valid than one 
which isn‘t. We may initially hold a certain moral theory to be true, but we‘re later presented 
with an axiom that is incompatible with the theory so we discard it and adopt one which is 
compatible, and this may happen again and again, theories discarded as we come into the 
realization of certain axioms. Presented in this way, Sidgwick‘s method may seem like the 
preferable one, but neither seem to fully satisfy: for if we follow Rawls‘s method then we can 
never be wrong, but if we follow Sidgwick‘s we can never quite know whether we are right or 
wrong and it seems difficult to measure exactly how far we are from the truly moral in our 
theory. So our choice seems to be between knowing we are always right, or knowing we may 
always be wrong.  
As we recall, Singer chided Rawls for comparing ethics to science and for promoting a 
method of ethics with many similarities to the scientific method. But, a curious point worth 
noting is that Sidgwick‘s method, in a way, now seems closer to the ideal of science than 
Rawls‘s method did. In science, after all, we try to arrive at what is really true, and we like to 
believe that progress within the field of science brings us closer to this goal. This is also 
what‘s happening with Sidgwick‘s method: we gain knowledge, we discover new principles 
or find out that previous principles were not correct after all, and we presumably (or 
hopefully) get closer to devising a moral theory that is as correct as it can be.  
Singer does not explicitly say whether or not Sidgwick‘s method is the method of doing ethics 
which he favours, only stating that it is the better method of the two presented in this paper, 
but it is clear from Singer‘s other writings and arguments that this is his method of choice. 
This method, in its modern incarnations, is often referred to as the deductive or top-down 
method of doing ethics, and we shall revisit it in the final chapter of this thesis, also trying to 
illustrate how it works in practice. 
 
JOHN RAWLS‟S ORIGINAL POSITION AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE AS 
SOURCES OF OBJECTIVE VALIDITY 
One idea of Rawls that Singer doesn‘t mention in his paper, is that of the veil of ignorance, 
which is an important part of A Theory Of Justice. These are novel methodological ideas 
which are worth looking into, and then we can see how the case against Rawls looks then. 
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The aim of A Theory Of Justice is to arrive at the principles of justice that we would accept as 
being the basic structure of our society.
39
 These principles of justice are to be chosen from 
what Rawls refers to as the original position, which is equivalent to the state of nature in used 
by the classic contractual thinkers; a hypothetical state of affairs in which all men are equal, 
rational, and self-interested. Rawls‘s original position is behind what he calls the veil of 
ignorance. 
In the original position, also called the initial situation, we do not know where we will end up 
in the society that we are deciding the principles of justice for. In fact, we do not have access 
to any contingent information regarding ourselves, such as what talents we possess, what we 
like and dislike, our character traits, and what we would deem as being a good life. As Rawls 
states: ―The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.‖40 To explain these 
odd restrictions, he immediately adds: ―This ensures that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency 
of social circumstances.‖41 This means that, while behind the veil of ignorance, we would not 
be able to formulate any principle which would specifically benefit ourselves, which we may 
otherwise be tempted to do, as we simply would not be able to do so. For example, if I knew 
that I had a particularly high IQ I might want to promote some principle that would make life 
as good as possible for those with high IQs. Or if I knew that I was wealthy, be it as a result of 
my own hard work or sheer luck, I would perhaps want the wealthy to be taxed as low as 
possible. But, we do not know whether we are wealthy or have a high IQ when behind the veil 
of ignorance. Ergo, we are not able to formulate any principles that benefit us over any others. 
While we do not have access to information about such contingencies behind the veil of 
ignorance, we do have access to general information. This includes general facts about human 
society, human psychology, politics, and economics. Rawls writes: ―Indeed, the parties are 
presumed to know whatever general facts affect the choice of the principles of justice.‖42 So 
presumably we would then know the basics in regards to the various religions as well as 
sexual orientations, and we might keep in mind that we could end up belonging to any 
religion and having any sexual orientation when choosing the principles of justice for society. 
                                                          
39
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 10. 
40
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 11. 
41
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 11. 
42
 Rawls, John, A Theory Of Justice, p. 119. 
26 
 
It should be noted that the principles of justice do not make up an all-encompassing theory of 
ethics, as Rawls makes explicit: ―we should recall here the limits of a theory of justice. Not 
only are many aspects of morality left aside, but no account is given of right conduct in regard 
to animals and the rest of nature. A conception of justice is but one part of a moral view.‖43 So 
the theory presented says little about topic of, say, abortion, animal rights, or other oft-
debated areas of applied ethics, and it does not tell us what we ought to do in any given 
situation. Of course, though the principles of justice are of limited scope, the underlying 
methodology of reflective equilibrium may still be used as the basis of a more complete, all-
encompassing ethical theory – and perhaps the same goes for the idea of an original position 
behind the veil of ignorance. 
To reach his description of the original position and the veil of ignorance, Rawls imagines 
that he has gone through a process of reflective equilibrium in order to describe it, while not 
actually going through it in writing.
44
  
But why is the idea of the original position needed when we have the method of reflective 
equilibrium? Could we not simply use this method when trying to arrive at the principles of 
justice? Rawls gives the following justification: ―It represents the attempt to accommodate 
within one scheme both reasonable philosophical conditions on principles as well as our 
considered judgments of justice.‖45 It seems then that it is a sort of short cut or a helpful tool, 
designed to let our sense of justice more easily come through; rather than going through the 
method of reflective equilibrium directly to arrive at the principles, which would no doubt be 
a tiresome and difficult affair, we try to take on a certain point of view which is (presumably) 
easier to grasp and apply. It seems that we, in a way, use reflective equilibrium to arrive at a 
description of the original position in which we do not have to directly use reflective 
equilibrium anymore. 
In Chapter IX of A Theory Of Justice, section 78 is entitled ―Autonomy And Objectivity‖, 
which is worth looking into considering Singer‘s claim that Rawls turns out to be a moral 
subjectivist and not an objectivist. In this section Rawls discusses the concepts of autonomy 
and objectivity in relation to the broader theory he has explored throughout. He writes: 
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 ―The idea of the initial situation is central to the whole theory and other basic notions are defined in 
terms of it. Thus acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to as free and 
equal rational beings, and that we are to understand this way. Also, these principles are objective. They 
are the principles that we would want everyone (including ourselves) to follow were we to take up 
together the appropriate general point of view. The original position defines the perspective, and its 
conditions also embody those of objectivity: its stipulations express the restrictions on arguments that 
force us to consider the choice of principles unencumbered by the singularities of the circumstances in 
which we find ourselves. The veil of ignorance prevents us from shaping our moral view to accord with 
our own particular attachments and interests. We do not look at the social order from our situation but 
take up a point of view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing. In this sense we look at our society 
and our place in it objectively: we share a common standpoint along with others and do not make our 
judgments from a personal slant. Thus our moral principles and convictions are objective to the extent 
that they have been arrived at and tested by assuming this general standpoint and by assessing the 
arguments for them by the restrictions expressed by the conception of the original position.‖ 46 
So it seems then, according to Rawls, that whatever principles we arrive at when 
hypothetically situating ourselves at the original position, would be objective. We do not 
arrive at the principles from our own viewpoint, but rather a viewpoint that is accessible to all 
others equally. If we are to agree to this, it would seem that Rawls may avoid Singer‘s 
subjectivism accusation, now that we have added in the idea of the original position and the 
veil of ignorance; ethics becomes more than judgments based on one‘s individual 
psychological past or personal inclinations, but is rather judgments arrived at from a certain 
position equally valid for all others who‘ve taken up the same stance.  
However, as we saw, Rawls said: ―The idea of the initial situation is central to the whole 
theory and other basic notions are defined in terms of it.‖ And later he adds: ―It is clear that 
this interpretation of autonomy and objectivity depends upon the theory of justice. The idea of 
the original position is used to give a consistent rendering of both notions.‖47 And as 
mentioned above, the original position and its veil of ignorance are something we arrive at 
through reflective equilibrium.  
In short, it seems that Rawls‘s conception of objectivity is something that one arrives at 
through his original position, and the original position and its veil of ignorance is given its 
description through the process of reflective equilibrium, and it is through engaging in this 
process that intuitions, and thus also subjectivism, creeps in; our considered judgments are 
used as data to give rise to the original position which in turn gives rise to the idea of 
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objectivity. His definition of objectivity is perhaps also too bound to his own theory; as he 
phrases it, it appears that objectivity is achieved specifically by using the original position 
idea that he has sketched. It then makes no sense to speak of other theories as even aspiring to 
any objective validity. Additionally, the way he explains that the original position results in 
objectivie validity for the principle of justice reached, it sounds more like an explanation of 
intersubjective validity, which we looked into earlier – principles being valid by reference to 
several individuals rather than just one. 
Though this may sound like a harsh verdict (and more could no doubt be said in regards to his 
conception of objectivity), Rawls‘s method and his overall ethics is certainly appealing for 
many reasons. It promotes agreement and critical thinking, and it manages to set up a certain 
safeguard against frivolous, impulsive, and perhaps just plain dumb opinions being taken 
seriously with his idea of considered judgments. The idea of the veil of ignorance may be a 
helpful mental tool for avoiding that our own selfish tendencies affect our judgments and 
actions. The method of reflective equilibrium may perhaps also seem more human and based 
in reality than a search for any self-evident principles to help guide our lives, taking its 
starting point in our actual moral capacity, ultimately treating morality as a social and cultural 
phenomenon. Thus whether we prefer Rawls‘s method, or something more similar to 
Sidgwick‘s method as presented here, may ultimately depend on how we view morality as an 
enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
CHAPTER 3 
ARGUMENT II: THE EVOLUTION ARGUMENT 
“ETHICS AND INTUITIONS” 
 
 
“There is little point in constructing a moral theory designed to match considered moral 
judgments that themselves stem from our evolved responses to the situations in which we and 
our ancestors lived during the period of our evolution as social mammals, primates, and 
finally, human beings.” 
Peter Singer, ―Ethics And Intuitions‖48 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Moral philosophers are not the only ones who have made morality their business; morality is 
also the business of moral psychologists. But unlike philosophers, psychologists are looking 
specifically at the human mind and the brain. Instead of wanting to find out what is morally 
right and wrong, they instead seek to study how humans develop the capabilities to reason and 
judge morally, and the cognitive processes behind moral judgment. Especially with the 
various technological advances, such as the development of the fMRI machine, some exciting 
new research in the field of moral psychology is being done. 
In Peter Singer‘s more recent paper ―Ethics And Intuitions‖, published in 2005, he again 
argues against the use of intuitions in ethics. Here he retreads some old ground, again 
referring to Rawls and holding up his reflective equilibrium method as both a misguided and 
ultimately dangerous way of doing ethics. But rather than arguing that using intuitions leads 
to subjectivism, he makes the claim that some recent research within moral psychology makes 
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a new case as to why intuitions should be dismissed. This argument I will be dubbing the 
evolution argument. 
In this chapter I will first look at and explain this new research Peter Singer bases his 
argument on,
 49
 before proceeding to examine his actual argument and how he believes this 
research makes a case against intuitions. For this part the focus will naturally be on the 
relevant paper mentioned above, but I will also look to both older and newer writings by 
Singer for some clarification in regards in to his argument. 
 
THE RESEARCH OF JOSHUA GREENE: RUNAWAY TROLLEYS 
Trolley problems or dilemmas are well known moral dilemmas in moral philosophy, 
introduced by philosopher Philippa Foot in her paper ―The Problem Of Abortion And The 
Doctrine Of Double Effect‖ from 196750, and many different variants of these dilemmas have 
since been created and discussed. The classic trolley dilemma is as follows: There is a 
runaway trolley heading down a pair of tracks on which five people are walking. If the trolley 
continues down the tracks, these five people will be killed by the trolley. As the trolley heads 
down the tracks, you are situated next to a switch which you can pull to make the trolley head 
down a different pair of tracks instead. However, on this other track there is a single person. 
He will be hit by the trolley and die if the switch is pulled. You have no way in which to warn 
any of the people on the tracks or to stop the trolley. Should you pull the switch? I shall refer 
to this dilemma simply as the trolley dilemma. 
There is another version of this dilemma, which will be referred to as the footbridge dilemma. 
As with the original trolley dilemma, there is a runaway trolley heading down a pair of tracks 
on which there are five people who will be killed if the trolley follows its route. You are 
standing on a footbridge above the tracks, and in front of you there is a very large man. In 
fact, he is so large that if you were to push him from the bridge and onto the tracks, the trolley 
would come to a stop. If you were to do so, the large man would be killed. So in order to stop 
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the trolley, you must push this large man down from the footbridge and onto the tracks, 
ending his life. Should you push the large man? 
Most people say yes to the trolley dilemma – that you should pull the switch – and no to the 
footbridge dilemma – that you should not push the heavy man onto the tracks.51 What exactly 
are the relevant differences between the two cases that warrants different answers - that it is 
right to sacrifice one life to save five lives in the one but not the other? The difference in 
judgement, according to Joshua Greene et al., lie in the emotions. 
―We maintain that, from a psychological point of view, the crucial difference between the trolley 
dilemma and the footbridge dilemma lies in the latter's tendency to engage people's emotions in a way 
that the former does not. The thought of pushing someone to his death is, we propose, more emotionally 
salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will cause a trolley to produce similar consequences, and 
it is this emotional response that accounts for people's tendency to treat these cases differently.‖52 
Greene and his colleagues did experiments in which participants were asked to respond to a 
number of dilemmas, both moral and non-moral, while their brains were scanned using fMRI. 
fMRI is an abbreviation of functional magnetic resonance imaging.
53
 
54
 This technology 
allows researchers to see the ongoing neural activity in the brain more or less as it happens, 
getting live images of which parts of the brain are active.  
They had two main hypothesis when conducting their experiments. The first was that those 
moral dilemmas relevantly similar to the footbridge dilemma would engage in people‘s 
emotional processing to a greater extent than those moral dilemmas relevantly similar to the 
trolley dilemma, and that these differences were relevant for people's final judgments. If this 
were the case, the fMRI scan would show the parts of the brain associated with emotions 
being more active during contemplation over dilemmas similar to the footbridge dilemma as 
opposed to the trolley dilemma. The second hypothesis was that there would be a longer 
reaction time in cases where a person‘s judgment would be going against their own emotions, 
such as for example saying yes to the footbridge dilemma – you ought to push the large man – 
despite having the feeling that it would be inappropriate to do so.
55
 
For the experiments conducted, they labeled the two kinds of moral dilemmas as impersonal 
and personal, with those relevantly similar to the trolley dilemma being labelled an 
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impersonal moral dilemma, and those relevantly similar to the footbridge dilemma labeled as 
a personal moral dilemma.
56
 A personal moral dilemma would be a dilemma ―in which the 
moral violation occurs in an ‗up-close-and-personal‘ manner‖57, a property that would be 
absent from the impersonal moral dilemmas. 
The experiments conducted supported both of their hypothesis; areas of the brain associated 
with emotion showed increased activity when presented with the personal than the non-
personal dilemmas, and the reaction time increased if the participants for example approved 
of pushing the large man in the footbridge dilemma, going against their own emotions.
58
 
59
 
The fact that there was a resulting delay in reaction time in the cases where participants went 
against their own emotions, indicates that the increased activity in the parts of the brain 
associated with emotions is simply not a correlation between one‘s final judgments, but is 
actually a cause of the judgment made. 
But why exactly do personal moral-dilemmas engage our emotions in a way non-personal 
moral dilemmas do? Why is it that people feel it is right to pull the switch to divert the trolley, 
but not push the large man off the footbridge to stop the trolley? 
Greene suggests that we react in this way due to our evolutionary past.
60
 It is now widely 
recognized that ―natural selection can favour altruistic instincts under the right 
conditions[.]‖61 Consequently we may feel as if we ought to save others from harm whenever 
we are so able. However, Greene states that ―our altruistic instincts will reflect the 
environment in which they evolved rather than our present environment.‖62 It is not until 
recently, thanks to new technology (such as trolleys and airplanes), that we have become able 
to directly save others from harm in a much less personal manner; our ancestors were only 
able to save others in a more direct, hands-on manner. The same is also true of inflicting 
harm; those in certain positions are now theoretically able to cause the death of a number of 
human beings just by the push of a button, unlike our ancestors who could only kill in a more 
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direct, hands-on manner. In short, ―people who are ‗up close and personal‘ push our 
emotional buttons, whereas those who are out of sight languish out of mind.‖63 
 
THE RESEARCH OF JONATHAN HAIDT: JULIE AND MARK 
Jonathan Haidt is another researcher who has done work in the field of moral psychology, and 
believes that his own social intuitionist model, or SIM for short, can provide a good 
description of how human beings normally
64
 make moral judgments. The SIM stresses the 
importance of human interaction and human intuitions when it comes to making moral 
judgments, with less emphasis on the reasoning process, which Haidt believes has been 
overemphasized in the past.
65
 Making moral judgments is not normally a solitary affair in 
which we reason our way to what is right and wrong, but it is rather a complex, dynamic 
process which is a part of the social life of human beings and therefore must be explained as 
such. 
Haidt and his colleagues did interview experiments in which participants were subjected to 
various hypothetical scenarios and asked to make a judgment as to whether or not the actions 
of those in the scenarios were morally right or wrong.
66
 One of the scenarios the participants 
were presented with was the following: 
―Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from 
college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be 
interesting and fun if they tried making love. At very least it would be a new experience for each of 
them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both 
enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which 
makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make 
love?‖67 
Most of the participants would say that the above action is wrong; it would not be right for 
Julie and Mark, two consenting adult siblings, to have sex. These evaluations would often be 
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arrived at shortly after the case had been stated. When asked to give a reason for their 
judgment by the interviewer, people might refer to the dangers of inbreeding, or the possible 
emotional harm that could suffer, only to be reminded that the siblings were using two forms 
of birth control and that they both enjoyed the act and would remember it fondly. The reasons 
participants gave for their judgment would be shot down, and the participants would search 
harder for other possible reasons, but they would rarely change their mind about their initial 
judgments; eventually the participants would simply admit to the interviewer that ―I don‘t 
know, I can‘t explain it, I just know it‘s wrong.‖68 Sometimes they would even laugh at their 
own inability to explain themselves. Haidt and his colleages coined the phrase morally 
dumfounded to refer to the state the participants would be in.
69
 
So it seemed that the reasons or arguments were not the cause of their judgments of right and 
wrong, as the judgments would stand even though the reasons they gave for it had been shown 
to be incorrect. So Haidt asks: ―what model or moral judgment allows a person to know that 
something is wrong without knowing why?‖70 The answer is, the SIM, which I will now try 
summarize. 
The SIM consists of four core links, and two additional links, all six explaining how moral 
judgment usually work in humans. See the illustration below. 
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71
 
 
When a person A finds himself presented with a certain situation, for example the 
hypothetical situation described above of consensual incest, A may find that this elicits in him 
a certain moral intuition. This intuition occurs before any judgment is made or any reasoning 
is conducted. A‘s intuition then dictates his judgment. This is called the intuitive judgment 
link (1). If A is like the majority of the participants in Haidt‘s research, his judgment would be 
that consensual incest is morally wrong. After A has made his judgment, he will go on to 
search for possible arguments that support the judgment he has made. This is the post hoc 
reasoning link (2). If A communicates his arguments for his judgments, a person B who is 
exposed to A‘s reasoning may find that it elicits in him certain intuitions, perhaps the same 
ones as A have, which may persuade him to agree with A. This is the reasoned persuasion link 
(3). But often our own moral intuitions are influenced just by others expressing moral 
judgments; humans are social creatures, and group norms can take root. Thus B may find his 
own intuitions not only shaped by A‘s reasoning, but also by A‘s judgment in and of itself. 
This is the social persuasion link (4). Likewise, A may find his intuitions influenced by B‘s 
judgment or reasoning.  
In addition to these four links, which make up the core of the SIM, there are two secondary 
links, which see less frequent use. For the most part, people do not change their moral 
judgments through the power of their own reasoning, Haidt claims, but it is rather changed by 
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having our intuitions affected by the reasoning or judgments of others, as ―people rarely 
override their initial intuitive judgments just by reasoning privately to themselves because 
reasoning is rarely used to question one‘s own attitudes or beliefs[.]‖72 But even though it 
rarely happens, it is possible; we may be able to reason our way to a certain judgment, finding 
actual arguments and then letting these arguments decide our judgment. This is the reasoned 
judgment link (5). And finally, our own reasoning process may lead us to activate new 
intuitions within ourselves, and in effect overriding our old intuitions, which in turn change 
our judgment. This final link is called the private reflection link (6).
 73
 
Let us try to make more sense of the above illustrated model, adding some meat to the links 
that have been sketched. According to Haidt, our reasoning is rarely the actual cause of our 
moral judgments. Instead it is most often our intuitions which are the cause of them. These are 
described as our immediate sense that something is wrong or right, our moral emotions or gut 
feelings, quick and automatic responses we do not have conscious access to.
 74
 Our reasoning 
process normally only kick in after the initial judgment has been made, constructing post hoc 
justifications. Our reasoning about certain cases is then normally rather a consequence of our 
moral judgment, and it is not the cause of it. That makes moral reasoning ―generally a post 
hoc construction intended to justify automatic moral intuitions.‖75 
―It is primarily when intuitions conflict, or when the situation demands thorough examination 
of all facets of a scenario, that the reasoning process is called upon‖76, Haidt says. For 
example, if we meet someone who states that something is morally right which we believe is 
morally wrong, we may start giving reasons as to why our view is the correct one, and why 
this other person‘s view is incorrect. Or as with the participants presented with the case of 
Julie and Mark; if only presented with the case they may just have made their moral judgment 
based on their intuitive feelings, finding it to be wring, and left it at that. But when asked to 
justify their judgment, reasoning kicks in.  Reasoning comes to our aid when our own 
judgment is challenged in some way. Haidt therefore suggests that the ―reasoning process is 
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more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or scientist seeking truth.‖77 But will the 
disagreeing party be persuaded by the reasons we present for our side? 
Haidt claims that ―our moral life is plagued by two illusions‖78 the first of which is the wag-
the-dog illusion
79
: we believe that our moral judgments, which would be the dog, are caused 
by our moral reasoning, the tail. The second illusion, which is more or less the first illusion 
but in a social aspect, is the wag-the-other-dog’s-tail illusion: we believe that by proving that 
another person‘s reasoning or arguments in regards to a moral issue to be flawed, we will 
change the mind of our opponent. But as Haidt states: ―Such a belief is like thinking that 
forcing a dog‘s tail to wag by moving it with your hand will make the dog happy.‖80 In a way, 
we‘re trying to persuade the wrong end. 
Normally we do not change the minds of others through reasoning directly, but rather by 
triggering in them certain intuitions. This is often done through reasoning though, arguments 
triggering certain intuitions in us. This would be the reasoned persuasion link. We can also 
change someone‘s mind simply by stating our own judgment on the matter, which may affect 
their intuitions as well, which would be the social persuasion link. 
But using the reasoned judgment link, it is possible for someone to override their intuitions, to 
reach a new judgment in spite of any intuitions they may feel, through the sheer force of their 
own reasoning. However, Haidt points out that this is something which rarely occurs in 
people, except for those who are more commonly used to this practice - namely philosophers, 
as Haidt states in the following two paragraphs:.  
―[P]eople are capable of engaging in private moral reasoning, and many people can point to times in 
their lives when they changed their minds on a moral issue just from mulling the matter over by 
themselves. Although some of these cases may be illusions [...], other cases may be real, particularly 
among philosophers, one of the few groups that has been found to reason well (Kuhn, 2001).‖81 
‖[A] person could, in principle, simply reason her way to a judgment that contradicts her initial 
intuition. The literature on everyday reasoning (Kuhn, 1991) suggests that such an ability may be 
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common only among philosophers, who have been extensively trained and socialized to follow 
reasoning even to very disturbing conclusions (as in the case of Socrates or the more recent work of 
Peter Singer [1994]), but the fact that there are at least a few people among us who can reach such 
conclusions on their own and then argue for them eloquently (Link 3) means that pure moral reasoning 
can play a causal role in the moral life of a society.‖82 
If it wasn‘t clear, the SIM is a descriptive model and not a normative model; it does not tell us 
how we ought to go about making moral judgments, or how we ought to debate one another 
on moral matters. It merely describes how both normally occurs. 
 
THE EVOLUTION ARGUMENT 
Not let us turn our attention to Peter Singer‘s text ―Ethics And Intuitions‖, published 2005. In 
the introduction of said text, Singer gives us the following promise: ―In the following pages I 
argue that recent research in neuroscience gives us new and powerful reasons for taking a 
critical stance toward common intuitions.‖83 The research he refers to is that of Joshua Greene 
and Jonathan Haidt, as summarized above. The fourth part of his paper, entitled ―Normative 
Implications‖, is where he seeks to deliver on his promise. Let us see how exactly he goes 
about doing this. 
As Greene himself did, Singer connects Greene‘s neuroscientific research with the theory of 
evolution, and thus paints an evolutionary story of why we have certain of our intuitions  in 
specific, why we intuitively object to pushing the large man in the footbridge dilemma, but 
not to hit the switch in the trolley dilemma. Both dilemmas seem to have the same results: we 
may deliberately bring about the death of one man to save five. The only difference is that we 
do so by different means, and with a different degree of direct personal involvement, which 
would not have been possible for our ancestors. The possibility of killing someone in such a 
way is too recent a possibility that it has not yet had the time to affect our evolutionary 
development in any way, and so it has not had time to affect our intuitions which has been 
shaped by evolution. In a way, our intuitions are outdated, not meshing well with our 
technology and the society we currently live in.
84
 This leads Singer to conclude, ―what is the 
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moral salience of the fact that I have killed someone in a way that was possible a million 
years ago, rather than in a way that became possible only two hundred million years ago? I 
would answer: none.‖85 
Though this may be correct, what is really the argument Singer here gives against using our 
intuitions as data in ethics? Singer seems to be arguing that because our intuitions are a result 
of our evolutionary past, they can't be trusted and should be ignored. I will call this the 
evolution argument. 
But if this is his argument, what then of reason? Reason is also a product of our evolutionary 
past. The evolution argument would most likely not bode well for any way of doing ethics 
whatsoever, perhaps making it an impossible endeavor. We are all products of our 
evolutionary past, and thus all our beliefs about and efforts to engage in ethics are tainted by 
it, not to be trusted, and must be discarded. So is he not shooting himself in the foot by 
making this claim, sketching an argument against the use of intuitions which also undermines 
his own way of doing ethics? 
 
REASON AS AN ESCALATOR 
Singer addresses this particular point in a text entitled ―Morality, Reason, And The Rights Of 
Animals‖ which was printed in the book Primate And Philosophers - How Morality Evolved 
from 2006. The text is mainly a commentary on a lecture by Dutch primatologist Frans de 
Waal, but Singer here also sheds some light on his evolution argument, although indirectly. 
Singer writes: 
―Though a capacity to reason helps us to survive and reproduce, once we develop a capacity for 
reasoning, we may be led by it to places that are not of any direct advantage to us, in evolutionary 
terms. Reason is like an escalatoronce we step on it, we cannot get off until we have gone where it 
takes us. An ability to count can be useful, but it leads by a logical process to the abstractions of higher 
mathematics that have no direct payoff in evolutionary terms..‖86 
The metaphor of the escalator was also used in Peter Singer‘s book The Expanding Circle, 
published in 1981: ―Beginning to reason is like steeping onto an escalator that leads upward 
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and out of sight.‖87 Here he further elaborates upon the example of mathematics.88 Being able 
to count can undoubtedly be evolutionary beneficial, both for ourselves and for other animals; 
―if four hunters go into a thicket and only three come out, baboons will keep away, for they 
know that someone is still there‖89. Presumably the same has held true for our ancestors, and 
probably holds true today – where would we be if we couldn‘t all pull at the count of three? 
Mathematics could further be used to divide loot or food among one‘s tribe, measure up land 
that belongs to your tribe, and a number of other uses. Eventually we arrive at the more 
advanced forms of mathematics. We started out merely counting, but in so doing we have 
stepped onto an escalator which will take us to the higher, more abstract forms of 
mathematics (at least if we follow its progression and do not step off the escalator prior to its 
destination). 
The question was asked as to why intuitions should be written off due to being products of 
evolution and why reasoning shouldn‘t, even though reasoning is also undoubtedly a product 
of evolution. He here seems to have given an answers to the question as to why having an 
evolutionary origin doesn‘t mean we should discard reasoning, namely that reasoning may 
lead to abstract thinking which do not increase one's chance of survival  does not give any 
evolutionary benefits. Intuitions presumably do give specific evolutionary benefits. 
But his answer falls short, as he fails to give any explanation as to why reasoning in any way 
should be placed higher than intuitions given that reasoning does not always give evolutionary 
benefits. Why should it matter that reasoning is an escalator which does not always increase 
our chance of survival? A preliminary answer would be that it shouldn't matter  at least not 
without any added explanations as to why. We may perhaps imagine a world in which high-
level abstract reasoning did grant several evolutionary benefits; would that mean that 
reasoning would suddenly have to be discarded as well? It is not whether or not reasoning 
gives evolutionary benefits or not that matter, but its intrinsic properties. 
In addition, not all of our intuitions do necessarily grant evolutionary benefits. Some 
intuitions may have granted them in the past when we lived under different circumstances, but 
not anymore. Would it be okay to use such intuitions in ethics when they grant no 
evolutionary benefits? The absurdity of this should be obvious, so there must be something 
more to the argument than this. 
                                                          
87
 Singer, Peter, The Expanding Circle, p. 88. 
88
 Singer, Peter, The Expanding Circle, p. 89-90. 
89
 Singer, Peter, The Expanding Circle, p. 89. 
41 
 
Looking again to The Expanding Circle, Singer here makes a similar (if not the same) point. It 
is normal for humans to feel that we should give greater priority to the suffering and interests 
of those who are a part of our community and are closer to us, than those who are not a part of 
the community and more distant. Some believe that such a principle of preferring our own 
over those who are strangers to us is only right and proper, and take the fact that many if not 
most of us feel such a principle to be evidence of its correctness. But this principle is simply a 
product of our biology, which again we can credit to out evolutionary history. Singer writes: 
―Discovering biological origins for our intuitions should make us skeptical about thinking of them as 
self-evident moral axioms. […] Without a biological explanation of the prevalence of some such 
principle, we might take its near-universal acceptance as evidence that our obligations to our family are 
based on a self-evident moral truth. Once we understand the principle as an expression of kin selection, 
that belief loses its credibility.‖90 
So when someone claims that their feeling that something is right or wrong is sufficient 
evidence that something is right and wrong, even if this feeling may be shared by the majority 
of the human population, we can merely point out that their feeling so is simply the product of 
evolution; they have a certain intuition because of evolution, not because the intuition is 
somehow valid. To phrase it differently, one could say they refer to no moral facts and are 
merely evolutionary constructs. Thus science can help us debunk and explain away moral 
beliefs and claims, showing that they are really something else rather than evidence for or 
against any specific moral claim. 
Still, the difficulties seem intact, namely that reason is also a product of evolution – and a part 
of our biology. Why can‘t the same be said of reasoning, and judgments made based on 
reasoning? We may have stepped onto an escalator which leads to levels of reasoning which 
would in no way help us survive, but we almost seem to have done the same with intuitions; 
they started out helping us survive and spreading our genes, but now they are preventing us 
from pushing large men off bridges in order to save lives. 
 
THE DEITY, THE DEMON, AND EVOLUTION 
I believe the following thought experiment should further illustrate why the evolution 
argument fails to persuade, and why a different approach may be recommended.  
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Imagine that there is a possible world in which our moral intuitions were given to us by a 
deity. Now imagine that there‘s another possible world in which our moral intuitions had 
instead been given to us by a demon. Would our intuitions in either of these worlds be more 
or less valid than those in the other world? It would only to the extent in which the source 
changed the actual intuitions themselves in some way, but then the real question seems to be 
about the content rather than the source. If the intuitions remained fixed, if the actual 
intuitions would not in any way be changed from the one world to the next, they would be 
equally valid or invalid, whether they were bestowed upon us by a deity or a demon – or 
through evolution. 
Of course, we may feel that intuitions given to us by a deity contra a demon would be more 
reliable, that they would be more likely to turn out to be good or correct intuitions. And 
certainly this could be the case. If the deity was benevolent and virtuous, only willing what 
was best for humanity, and with knowledge about truth and ethics, we could certainly feel 
confident to put our trust in intuitions given to us by this being. If the demon, on the other 
hand, was a vile and corrupt being, only willing what was worst for humanity, finding its 
pleasure in pain and pestilence, we may feel more sceptical in putting our trust in intuitions 
given to us by this creature. If the actual intuitions they would give us would reflect their 
respective good and evil natures, we would certainly reject them if they came from the demon 
and accept them if they came from the deity. 
But as stated, if the intuitions remained fixed, if they were the same in both cases, the source 
would not matter, be the source a deity or a demon or the process of evolution. We need to 
look more specifically at what intuitions are, not where they come from – though answering 
the latter may help answering the former. So rather than saying they are normatively impotent 
due to their origins, we should instead say that they are normatively impotent due to their very 
nature. I will be trying to sketch such an argument in the next chapter. 
 
RATIONAL INTUITIONS? 
As we remember from the last chapter when looking at Henry Sidgwick‘s method, the 
question as to how we ultimately would arrive at and prove valid a moral principle was left 
unsatisfactorily answered. Self-evidence was referred to, but how seeing a principle as being 
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self-evidence is different from using intuitions might be unclear. In the concluding part of 
―Ethics And Intuitions‖, Singer tries to give us an answer. 
He starts by making the problem explicit, airing what many readers may feel is at stake: 
―Whenever it is suggested that normative ethics should disregard our common moral intuitions, the 
objection is made that without intuitions, we can go nowhere. There have been many attempts, over the 
centuries, to find proofs of first principles in ethics, but most philosophers consider that they have all 
failed. Even a radical ethical theory like utilitarianism must rest on a fundamental intuition about what 
is good. So we appear to be left with our intuitions, and nothing more. If we reject them all, we must 
become ethical skeptics or nihilists.‖91 
So if we say that all our intuitions are invalid, that they cannot be used because they are 
subjective or the result of evolution, does that mean that we‘ll have to throw away any notion 
of any theories of morality being shown to be valid or invalid? How else are we to find out 
what is right, if we are not to use our moral intuitions? In short, do we have to become 
nihilists?  
Singer proposes a solution to this conundrum, referring to the research of Haidt and Greene: 
―Haidt‘s behavioural research and Greene‘s brain imaging studies suggest the possibility of 
distinguishing between our immediate emotionally based responses, and our more reasoned 
conclusions.‖92 So it may be possible to separate between two kinds of responses: those that 
are rational, and those that are not, and we can separate between the two through empirical 
research, studying human behaviour as well as the direct activity that occurs in the human 
brain, as Haidt and Greene have to some extent done. One such rational response, Singer 
suggests, is that the death of one is a lesser tragedy than the death of five (or, presumably, 
two, three, and four as well). Participant‘s in Greene‘s experiment who were exposed to the 
two trolley cases did not always recognize this when it came to the footbridge dilemma. As 
we‘ll recall, the footbridge dilemma showed increased activity in the emotional parts of their 
brains compared to the trolley dilemma, as it was a more personal dilemma that went against 
their evolutionarily developed altruistic feelings, and those who believed it would be better to 
save five people by pushing and in effect killing the one person showed increased reaction 
times due to the conflict between their own emotions and their reasoning. So Singer 
confidently concludes: ―The death of one person is a lesser tragedy than the death of five 
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people. That reasoning leads us to throw the switch in the standard trolley case, and it should 
also lead us to push the stranger in the footbridge‖93. 
But isn‘t this some kind of intuition, that ―the death of one person is a lesser tragedy than the 
death of five‖? And weren‘t Singer against the use of intuitions as they were just evolutionary 
artifacts and morally irrelevant? Singer admits that the former, while denying the latter, as we 
see here: 
 ―It might be said that the response that I have called ―more reasoned‖ is still based on an intuition, for 
example the intuition that five deaths are worse than one, or more fundamentally, the intuition that it is 
a bad thing if a person is killed. But if this is an intuition, it is different from the intuitions to which 
Haidt and Greene refer. It does not seem to be one that is the outcome of our evolutionary past.‖94 
And Singer concludes his paper with the following paragraph: 
―In the light of the best scientific understanding of ethics, we face a choice. We can take the view that 
our moral intuitions and judgments are and always will be emotionally based intuitive responses, and 
reason can do no more than build the best possible case for a decision already made on nonrational 
grounds. [...] Alternatively, we might attempt the ambitious task of separating those moral judgments 
that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have a rational basis. This is a 
large and difficult task. Even to specify in what sense a moral judgment can have a rational basis is not 
easy. Nevertheless, it seems to me worth attempting, for it is the only way to avoid moral scepticism.‖95 
Thus Singer‘s conclusion is that, yes, we do actually have to rely on some intuitions on a 
methodological level when we go about building our moral theories. But, we can separate 
between rational and non-rational intuitions, and one way to do this is through empirical 
research, revealing which intuitions correspond with the parts of our brains associated with 
emotions, which give us evolutionary benefits, and which are culturally contingent; in short, 
revealing which intuitions can be explained away and which a moral theory then does not 
need to account for. Presumably the intuitions we are left with, and which presumably 
correspond with the parts of our brain associated with more abstract reasoning, are the ones 
we can use as data in regards to building, disproving, or validating a moral theory. As Singer 
admits, finding these intuitions would be no small task. 
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In a way, Singer is then not actually an anti-intuitionist as he often may appear to be, being 
against the use of intuitions in ethics; but rather, he is a rational or restrictive intuitionist, 
believing that only certain intuitions may be used, as opposed to none. 
Similarities to John Rawls‘s concept of considered judgments, as described in the previous 
chapter, seems obvious; only our everyday judgments which can be called considered can 
actually be used as valid data when doing moral philosophy. They are, however, not identical; 
first and foremost, Rawls did not appear to place as heavy an emphasis on reason as Singer 
here does. Rawls is also referring to judgments, which these rational intuitions are not. 
Considered judgments are arguably a wider concept as well, encompassing more, whereas 
Singer‘s idea of rational intuions is narrower, allowing fewer pieces of data to pass scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ARGUMENT III: THE PARTIALITY ARGUMENT 
 
 
“[I]t is our developed capacity to reason that gives us the ability to take the impartial 
perspective.” 
Peter Singer, ―Morality, Reason, And The Rights Of Animals‖96 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the two arguments Peter Singer tries to develop 
against using our moral intuitions as data for any kind of moral truth or validity, may not be as 
convincing as he would have liked, with certain central aspects not sufficiently clarified for us 
to be fully won over. Singer seems to concentrate too much on the origin of intuitions through 
evolution, culture, and psychology, and devotes too little time on what exactly intuitions are 
(or are not), independently of their origin. It may turn out that their origin is something 
entirely different than we have so far believed. Would this then change the status of our moral 
intuitions as potential data to be used when constructing our normative theories? If we argue 
against intuitions based mainly on their origin, then maybe it would. 
In this chapter I will try to sketch a different argument against the use of intuitions, an 
argument I believe is not only fully compatible with Singer‘s ethic, but an argument which 
may lie implicitly in some of his works and arguments; it is an argument which he seems to 
have almost made himself, but which he has never made explicit. The argument is, briefly 
stated, that by using our own moral intuitions as moral data, we may be committing the sin of 
partiality, and it is widely recognized that partiality must be altogether avoided in moral 
theory and that the opposite of partiality is the ideal, namely impartiality. 
                                                          
96
 Singer, Peter, ―Morality, Reason, And The Rights Of Animals‖, p. 145. 
47 
 
I do not expect that this attempted sketch of an argument to be free of problems (which 
perhaps few, if any, arguments in philosophy are), but I hope it will serve as a promising start 
for a more sophisticated and streamlined argument against moral intuitions, as well as 
presenting some interesting propositions not yet fully explored elsewhere. As Singer states in 
a footnote in his paper ―Ethics And Intuitions‖, which we discussed in the previous chapter of 
this thesis: ―this paper is no more than a sketch of an argument that I hope to develop more 
adequately in [the] future.‖97 The same holds true for the current chapter. 
 
IMPARTIALITY, AND THE PARTIALITY ARGUMENT 
Impartiality and its evil twin partiality, are terms that are often used and referred to, often 
thrown around in discussions of morality, but are rarely the sole subject of any such 
discussion and is rarely attempted fully explained. To quote philosopher Bernard Gert from 
his book Common Morality: ―Impartiality has been so neglected by philosophers that it is not 
surprising that the brief characterizations of it has been so inadequate.‖98 I fear that I may here 
end up committing the same crime as I will not supply a concise definition, but will instead be 
satisfied with trying to shed sufficient light on the terms so that we can more or less make out 
what they imply and refer to. 
Singer is one of these philosophers who often talks of impartiality when discussing normative 
ethics, and though he may not have given an airtight definition of the concept, he has said 
enough of substance to give us a good idea of what it entails. In his book The President Of 
Good And Evil, he has the following to say about impartiality: ―When we think ethically, we 
should do so from an impartial perspective, from which we recognize that our own wants and 
desires are no more significant than the wants and desires of everyone else.‖99 So from this we 
may infer that impartiality is about taking a certain perspective, and that this perspective then 
leads to recognizing that other people have wants and desires that are neither more nor less 
significant than our own wants and desires. 
When talking of impartiality, Singer occasionally cites the following famous line from Henry 
Sidgwick‘s The Methods Of Ethics (which Singer identified as making up Sidgwick‘s third 
axiom, as stated in the previous section): ―the good of any one individual is of no more 
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importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any 
other[.]‖100 101 At more length, he Singer has the following to say about impartiality in his 
book Practical Ethics: 
―[A]n ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. Ethics 
takes a universal point of view. […] [I]n making an ethical judgment we go beyond our own 
likes and dislikes. From an ethical point of view, the fact that it is I who benefit from, say, a 
more equal distribution of income and you who lose by it, is irrelevant. Ethics requires us to 
go beyond ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ to the universal law, the universalisable judgment, the standpoint of 
the impartial spectator or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it.‖102 
Several new concepts are introduced here, which Singer seems to be saying refer roughly to 
the same idea, but let us try to stick with impartiality. We can now add that impartiality 
involves breaking down the boundaries between individuals, erasing the differences between 
the me and the you. In a way, we try to remove ourselves from ourselves. And if we say that a 
moral judgment is impartial, then it must be a judgment that has been made from an impartial 
perspective. 
This kind of impartiality can be demonstrated by looking to a well known example found in 
anarchist William Godwin‘s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, published 1793, which has 
been the topic of some of Singer‘s writings.103 Imagine that the palace of Archbishop Fénelon 
is burning, and two people are trapped inside: the Archbishop himself, and his chambermaid. 
Imagine further that you would be able to save one and only one of the two, having to leave 
the other to perish in the flames. Whom should you choose to save? At the time of the fire the 
Archbishop is known and loved by the society at large, and he has not yet contributed his 
most important intellectual work, the didactic novel Telemachus, which would be of great 
personal help to many. So the answer, according to Godwin, is that the Archbishop Fénelon 
should be saved. 
But imagine instead that the chambermaid had been your wife or mother. How should this 
affect your choice? According to Godwin, it shouldn‘t: the Archbishop is still the one who 
should be saved. At the time of publication, this spurred a series of objections, and it remains 
a controversial proposition today. Do we not, after all, have some sort of special obligations 
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towards our mothers or wives? They are, after all, our mothers and wives. But from an 
impartial perspective, this does not seem to matter, as we evaluate the situation removed from 
ourselves and our special relations to one another do not weigh heavier than other 
considerations. 
Readers may see that this appears fairly utilitarian, but impartiality is something most 
normative theories aim at and try to incorporate in some way – at the very least also 
deontological theories. The deontologically inclined could very well agree that we need to 
take on an impartial perspective and do our moral evaluations unsullied by the various 
contingencies of our lives. Famous 17
th
 century deontological philosopher Immanuel Kant 
stated in his Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Morals that ―every rational being must act 
as if he were by his maxims at all times a lawgiving member of the universal kingdom of 
ends.‖104 Imagining ourselves as the lawgivers of this ―kingdom of ends‖ seems to be roughly 
the same as the idea of an impartial perspective. However, Kant and other deontologists may 
disagree with the conclusion Godwin reached. It could be, due to certain duties or rights 
present, that we ought, impartially, to save our mothers or wives before Archbishops from 
burning palaces – as would anyone in the same situation be obligated to do.  
It should be noted that impartiality is not the same as equality. Impartiality is to take a certain 
perspective, and to act on this perspective, whereas equality, I would suggest, seems to be 
more practical. Equality always refers to something specific, like equal pay or equal rights, 
whereas impartiality seems a more abstract concept from what we have said above. And it 
does not appear impossible that we may very well arrive at some forms of practical inequality 
when we take the impartial perspective. 
But so far we have said little of partiality and intuitions. Partiality must be something akin to 
the opposite of impartiality; perhaps to perceive things as ourselves, seeing and acting upon 
our own preferences. Presumably this would involve saving our own mother of wife from the 
burning palace rather than the Archbishop, simply because it would be a greater personal 
tragedy to me than any considerations made impartially. 
What I would like to claim is that if we use rely on our intuitions to tell us what is right and 
wrong, we are being partial. Instead of helping us to remove ourselves from ourselves, 
intuitions instead help anchor us further to ourselves. Intuitions are something that we feel, 
they are inaccessible to others, and they are often tied up to the contingencies of our own lives 
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– such as our mothers and wives, and our overall interests. This to me appears to be the 
opposite of impartiality as we have sketched it. 
If we accept this, and if we accept that any moral judgments and theories must be have a 
certain element of impartiality, then it would be wrong to say that moral intuitions are merely 
morally relevant; instead, we would have to say that intuitions are actually immoral as 
intuitions would lead to partiality which is opposed to impartiality. It also appears to me that 
this is a stronger argument than the two previous arguments Singer has made, as it seems to 
makes intuitions necessarily wrong, independently of their origins; intuitions have certain 
qualities that make them partial, and if they do not have these qualities they are not 
intuitions.
105
 
The kind of impartiality we have tried sketching above is not without its problems, though. 
Philosopher Mary Ann Warren says in her book Moral Status: ―In making judgments about 
the moral status of living things, we are not (or should not be) seeking to estimate their value 
from the viewpoint of the gods, or that of the universe. We are not gods but human beings, 
reasoning about how we ought to think and act.‖106 And Bernard Gert, whom we quoted 
above, makes a similar comment: ―Very good philosophers have said that impartiality is 
taking a God‘s-eye point of view or the point of view of the universe. Since no one knows 
what such a point of view is, these remarks are useless.‖107 
So according to Gert, we do not know enough about what taking an impartial perspective 
would involve for this to be a useful notion; and according to Warren, this is a flawed project 
as morality is not about removing ourselves from our own humanity. These may be valid 
points worth exploring further, and to give a brief reply, it appears that humans are capable of 
great feats of imagination. A favourite pastime of children is to play pretend, to play that they 
are astronauts or pirates or a number of other fanciful things. In a way, they are removing 
themselves from themselves, pretending to be someone else. When human children are 
capable of this, it does not seem impossible that we as adults can put ourselves at the more 
abstract ―viewpoint of the gods‖, even though some further clarification would be needed. 
And it might altogether be unnecessary to invoke the idea gods as well; perhaps we could 
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instead call it a ‗viewpoint from our common humanity‘ and try to describe it as such, or 
perhaps instead build on Kant‘s idea of a ―kingdom of ends‖. Our moral reasoning will 
necessarily always be rooted in our human nature one way or the other, and I see nothing 
immediately wrong or inhumane about rooting it in our capabilities for impartiality. 
 
DOES PETER SINGER MAKE THE PARTIALITY ARGUMENT? 
At times it almost appears that Singer makes something akin to the partiality argument – that 
intuitions are partial, and cannot lead us to any form of impartiality. In ―Morality, Reason, 
And The Rights Of Animals‖ there are a number of passages where he comes close to doing 
so, as we can see:  
"[I]t is our developed capacity to reason that gives us the ability to take the impartial 
perspective. As reasoning beings, we can abstract from our own case and see that others, 
outside our group, have interests similar to our own. We can also see that there is no impartial 
reason why their interests should not count as much as the interests of members of our own 
group, or indeed as much as our own interests. Does this mean that the idea of impartial 
morality is contrary to our evolved nature? Yes, if by ―our evolved nature‖ we mean the nature 
that we share with the other social mammals from which we evolved. No nonhuman animals, 
not even the other great apes, come close to matching our capacity to reason. So if this 
capacity to reason does lie behind the impartial element of our morality, it is something new in 
evolutionary history.‖108 
―We do not have to accept, as a given, the emotional responses imprinted in our biological 
nature by millions of years of living in small tribal groups. We are capable of reasoning and of 
making choices, and we can reject those emotional responses. Perhaps we do so only on the 
basis of other emotional responses, but the process involves reason and abstraction, and may 
lead us […] to a morality that is more impartial than our evolutionary history as social 
mammals – in the absence of that reasoning process – allow.‖109 
So Singer appears to be saying that it is through our advanced reasoning ability that we are 
capable of being impartial and taking an impartial perspective, going beyond the limits of the 
secluded tribal societies of old. Reasoning is also what we use to reject ―emotional 
responses‖, or moral intuitions. Implicitly it then seems as Singer is saying that impartiality is 
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at odds with relying on our intuitions for moral validity, but he never says so explicitly. 
Instead we see that what he ultimately tries arguing for is the evolution argument, equating 
intuitions with evolution and therefore declaring them to be morally irrelevant. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, the evolution argument ended up not being a fully satisfying argument, 
and I believe he could have a better case against intuitions if he instead tried developing an 
argument against intuitions based on the notions of impartiality and partiality (preferably 
without invoking evolution). 
 
JEAN PIAGET: THE THREE-MOUNTAIN PROBLEM 
Singer looking to Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene‘s research and theories to show the 
possibility of using reasoning when making moral judgments and to develop the evolutionary 
argument. But for the partiality argument, we ought to look at the famous research conducted 
by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, a pioneer in the field of developmental psychology, 
who sought to explore the thought processes of children and how it developed as they aged.
110
 
According to Piaget‘s stage model of cognitive development, children can be in one of four 
stages depending on their age (and certain other factors), each stage with their own cognitive 
milestones and limitations. 
One of these stages is the preoperational stage (age 2 to 7), where the children show a large 
degree of egocentrism, which is defined as ―difficulty in viewing the world from someone 
else's perspective.‖111 This can be illustrated by what‘s referred to as Piaget‘s three-mountain 
problem.
112
 We can imagine a model in front of us which consists of three mountains. On one 
side of the model, a path is visible. On the opposite side of the model, the path is not visible. 
A child in the preoperational stage sees the model, let‘s say his name is Ted, from the side on 
which the path is visible. Another child, Beth, is looking at the same model as Ted, but from 
the opposite side, from which the path is not visible. But if Ted were asked to describe what 
Beth sees when she is looking at the model, Ted would include in his description the path. For 
anyone who has progressed beyond the preoperational stage it should be obvious that Beth is 
incapable of seeing the path from where she is viewing the model. This shows that Ted ―has 
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failed to recognize Beth's perspective as different from his own‖113 and therefore is 
egocentric. 
It should be noted that egocentrism this is not the same as selfishness. Selfishness would be to 
only care about your own needs and desires, never to give any weight as to what other people 
would want. Egocentrism, on the other hand, is the inability to realize that other people 
perceive things differently from you.  
So Ted, a child at Piaget‘s preoperational stage, is not able to separate his own point of view 
from that of others‘. Once he grows older, given that he develops normally, he will be able to 
do so.  Then he will be able to distinguish his own perspective from that of Beth‘s, and be 
able to put himself in her shoes when he is to describe what it is Beth can see when looking at 
the model described above. We may feel tempted to say that Ted is unable to be impartial at 
his current age, and that once he comes of age he will be able to be impartial. But that would 
be too strong a proposition, as how the ability to recognize another‘s perspective as being 
different from one‘s own connects with the concept of impartiality is not clear. But I would 
claim that it is a cognitive ability that would be needed if impartiality is at all to be possible – 
how can we be impartial if we are trapped in our own perspective? More cautiously we could 
maybe suggest that this ability is, at least, a necessary condition for impartial thinking. 
I believe that further research into egocentrism and impartial thinking could prove to be of 
some interest for modern normative ethics. For example, one could organize an experiment in 
which fMRI technology would be used to see the activity in the brains of participants when 
engaged in activities similar to those that Ted was in (recognizing and taking another person‘s 
perspective), and then compare this to the activity evident in the brain when making moral 
judgments. Looking at the data, we could then ask, are the parts of the brain associated with 
recognizing another‘s perspective active, and to what extent are they active when someone 
judges mostly from pure intuition compared to that of judgments where the a process of 
reasoning is taking place to a larger extent? The results could have implications for the 
partiality argument which I have tried to sketch; if it turns out that the activity in the brain 
when recognizing another‘s perspective corresponds significantly to the activity in the brain 
when making moral judgments with a larger degree of reasoning, we might say that the 
argument is supported; if on the other hand it turns out that the activity present when 
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recognizing another‘s perspective mostly corresponds to the activity when making intuitively 
based moral judgments, we might say that the argument has been undermined. 
Let‘s try to make this suggested research a bit clearer by looking at Joshua Greene‘s research 
once more. It was suggested that people who required more time to arrive at a judgment in the 
footbridge dilemma did so because they went against their own intuitive responses, and 
instead used their reasoning abilities. Participants who did not make a judgment contrary to 
their intuitive responses did not use as long to arrive at their judgment.  The former would 
then be a moral judgment involving a larger degree of reasoning, and the latter would be a 
purely intuitive judgment. fMRI was used to capture the brain activity of the participants; thus 
we roughly know what activity occurs in the brain when we make moral judgments based on 
reasoning, and when we make moral judgments based on intuitions. Optionally further and 
perhaps different experiments could be conducted to get more data on this. 
This data could then be compared to the data of a second experiment for which the aim is to 
map the brain activity involved in forms of impartial thinking. Participants could be presented 
with the three-mountain model and asked to describe what someone else, looking at the model 
from another perspective, should be able to see from their perspective. Other models or tasks 
could certainly be used, perhaps ranging from the simple to the more complex, and perhaps 
the experiment could be conducted on people of varying ages. While engaged in this task, the 
activity in the brains of the participants would be captured using fMRI. This data could then 
be compared to the data we have on the brain‘s activity when making different moral 
judgments, and we could see where the activity overlaps. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS AN ETHICAL SOCIETY 
 
 
 “[I] f we are philosophers, there should be times when we reflect critically on our intuitions – 
indeed not only philosophers, but any thoughtful people, should do this.” 
Peter Singer, One World
114
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Now we have looked at three possible arguments against the use of moral intuitions as data in 
moral methodology. We have also looked at some research that has been done within the vast 
field of psychology. But what, if any, practical implications does all this have? Or is this all 
merely theory, without any effect on our society or on our individual lives? 
Singer does not wish to do philosophy that is merely theoretical, nor does he want others to do 
so, instead wanting philosophers and philosophy to focus on actual issues that matter.
115
 By 
doing normative moral philosophy, we are actually exploring how we are to live. 
Peter Singer has released several books on how we ought to live and how to achieve 
(according to his brand of utilitarianism) a better world; One World, Animal Liberation, and 
Rethinking Life And Death being examples.  However, this section is not so much about how 
one ought to live according to Singer‘s utilitarianism or any other specific moral theory, but 
rather how we are to engage in and apply morality, and how we can create a more moral 
society in and of itself, regardless of the content of the morality we wish to spread, given that 
we agree with Singer‘s methodological stance and aversion towards intuitions. 
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Some of these suggestions may be fairly obvious and perhaps even dull, which one would 
accept regardless of one‘s views on intuitions and moral methodology; other suggested 
implications may be less obvious and not so easy to accept. 
So in this concluding chapter I will be exploring some practical implications that may be 
inferred from the foregoing discussion about the use of intuitions, which could lead to a 
society which can be said to be more ethical. I will start by making explicit Singer‘s moral 
methodology – the basic method for which we are to find out what is right and wrong – and 
showing how Singer has applied it in one of his classic texts in applied ethics. 
 
PETER SINGER‟S MORAL METHODOLOGY: THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO 
ETHICS 
Through the previous sections we have gotten a good idea of the methodology Singer himself 
recommends. It appears to essentially be the same as Henry Sidgwick‘s method, which we 
described in the second chapter. But let us use this section to try to illustrate this method a bit 
more clearly. 
Gerald Dworkin gives the following description of this method‘s ethos in his article ―Theory, 
Practice, And Moral Reasoning‖: ―A moral theory contains rules or principles that, together 
with the details of the particular circumstances, allows us to deduce the right thing to do.‖116 
So if we were utilitarians, we would start with the greatest happiness principle as the core 
moral principle. In order to know what the principle would recommend, we would need a 
certain amount of knowledge regarding the situation we are facing – specifically: how any 
possible alternatives for action would affect the amount of happiness in the world. Imagine 
that we find ourselves in a situation with two routes available to choose from as to how we 
would act, action 1 and action 2. Presumably we would know enough to know roughly which 
of these two possible actions would lead to the most happiness, and we could make the 
following calculation: 
Premise 1 (the principle): The right thing to do is that which would lead to the most 
happiness. 
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Premise 2 (the relevant information about the case in question): Action 1 would lead to 
the most happiness. 
Conclusion: Action 1 is the right thing to do. 
But what if we disagree with the conclusion? What if we believe that action 2 would actually 
be the right action in this situation? One could claim that there may have been a 
miscalculation involved in how much happiness each of the two actions would lead to. 
Perhaps some factors were overlooked; factors which would clearly show that action 2 would 
lead to the most happiness out of the two, thus making premise number two untrue, and 
therefore the conclusion false. This would be a perfectly valid counterargument against the 
conclusion reached. We would then have this illustration instead: 
P1: The right thing to do is that which would lead to the most happiness. 
P2: Action 2 would lead to the most happiness. 
C: Action 2 is the right thing to do. 
Another possibility would be to argue against the conclusion by arguing against the first 
premise, namely that utilitarianism is correct. One could argue for Kantianism, virtue ethics, 
or any other theory of ethics. Let‘s say that we argue for virtue ethics. Then we may end up 
with something akin to this: 
P1: The right thing to do is that which a virtuous person would do. 
P2: Action 2 is what a virtuous person would do. 
C: Action 2 is the right thing to do. 
Either of these two ways would be a perfectly valid way of arguing for or against the rightness 
of any action: by discarding either of the premises involved, which could be either the actual 
moral principle or the empirical facts.  
Given this, our intuitions or beliefs that a conclusion about what is right or wrong is false, is 
no actual measure as to whether said conclusion is or is not actually false. The domain of 
morality is under the rule of the moral principle. A moral theory X may tell us that action 1 is 
the morally right action to do, and we know that it is morally right because this is what theory 
X tells us. You, however, may believe that action 2 is the morally right action to do, not 
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action 1. Your belief or intuition that this is so is not sufficient grounds for an argument that 
this is the case. Instead, you must have a theory Z that tells you that action 2 is the right 
action. In a way, it is not the instances that are pitted against each other  action 1 versus 
action 2  but rather the theories which justifies the instances  theory X versus theory Z. To 
argue for action 2, you must argue for theory Z. Theory Z, however, may very well be a 
theory which states that that which is right is that which matches our intuitions. 
Also, the principle itself may recognize that the actual moral intuitions and beliefs people 
have should be counted as relevant empirical data while holding that intuitions still are not to 
be counted as data for any moral truth. Having our personal moral convictions violated in 
some way is rarely pleasurable, so going against someone‘s moral convictions might reduce 
the total amount of happiness in the world, which is undesirable from a utilitarian perspective. 
Thus we might in theory end up with complex situations in which the right thing to do would 
actually be the wrong thing to do if it weren‘t for enough people believing strongly enough 
that it would be the right thing to do. 
So to arrive at what is right we first need to have a moral principle. This principle should tell 
us what elements we should look for in certain cases, what relevant empirical data we need. 
The principle together with this data then gives us the verdict as to what is the morally right 
action in any specific case.  
This method of doing ethics can be referred to as a top-down approach to ethics. We start at 
the top, and work our way down. At the top we have a certain principle or principles, some 
moral truth or truths in which we are certain, and we work our way down from the top to the 
specific cases. It is always this top which we refer to when judging and acting in specific 
instances. In short, we deduce our way to what is right; this method can then also 
appropriately be referred to as the deductive method of ethics. 
An obvious possible problem with the top-down method is how we are to arrive at the 
supposed top principle. As the reader may have noted, a big leap was made above when we 
simply discarded utilitarianism in favour of for virtue ethics above. It‘s all well that particular 
actions must be justified by being shown to be deductible from a moral principle, but how can 
the moral principle itself be justified? 
We recognized this as a problem in chapter 2 when we looked at Henry Sidgwick‘s method. 
And in fact, both of the founders of modern utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
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Mill, seem to agree that the utilitarian principle cannot really be proved – nor could any other 
first principles be proved. Referring to the principle of utility, Bentham wrote: ―Is it 
susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing 
else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. 
To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.‖117 Mill seems to be in agreement with 
Bentham, as he writes: ―questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary 
acceptation of the term. To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all first 
principles; to the first premises of our knowledge, as well as to those of our conduct.‖118 
Perhaps ironically they both actually proceed to give proofs for the utilitarian principle all the 
same - and Mill‘s proof in particular has faced heated debate among philosophers. However, 
they were perhaps not thinking that such principles could not be shown to be right, but rather 
that you could not arrive at them through deductive reasoning; first principles are what you 
use to deduce other things from, but they cannot themselves be deduced from anything else. If 
they could, then what you have is not really a first principle after all, and rather the principle 
or principles you used for the deduction are the true first principles. 
The answer we appealed to in chapter 2 was simply the self-evidence of the principles, and in 
chapter 3 the notion of rational intuitions was introduced. In short, the only way in which a 
moral principle can be justified is if it doesn‘t need to be justified; simply stating and 
understanding it is sufficient ‗proof‘ of its moral validity or lack thereof, using our ability to 
reason. We may still be mistaken about the top principle though, but mistakes can be reduced 
by drawing on the resource pool of common sense morality as we saw Sidgwick suggest, 
comparing our principles to the moral judgments and intuitions of others. We may also 
separate between our own intuitions of a principle‘s self-evidence from the moral intuitions 
that have their origins in our culture, our specific personal psychology, or which grant (or 
have previously granted) evolutionary benefits, as we saw Singer suggest in chapter 3. In 
short, separating our morally irrelevant intuitions from those which are grounded in reason –  
such as the lives of five having more worth than the life of one. 
It should be made explicit that this particular method of doing ethics is not reserved for 
utilitarianism in specific nor consequentialist theories in general. Deontologists appear to be 
using this method as well, or something close to it. There is Immanuel Kant, who establishes 
his categorical imperative as the core ethical principle, which is then the principle situated at 
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the top which we deduce our way down from to the specific cases.
119
 Rights and duties, 
central concepts for most deontological theories, may very well serve as first principles, and 
they must then be referred to in specific situations to justify our actions morally. 
 
THE TOP-DOWN METHOD IN ACTION: “FAMINE, AFFLUENCE, AND 
MORALITY” 
Singer‘s top-down methodology to ethics is well illustrated in his paper ―Famine, Affluence, 
And Morality‖, published 1972, which has become a classic in both contemporary normative 
ethics as well as applied ethics. The topic of this paper is what obligations those living in 
wealthier nations have to those living in poorer, famine-struck nations. In particular he writes 
about the nation of Bengal and the hardships and suffering its population were enduring at the 
time of the paper being written, and what the normally well-off in other countries, which 
would be us, should do – if anything – to help reduce the suffering of those in foreign nations. 
His conclusion, roughly stated, is that we ought to help until it starts hurting us more than it 
benefits those who‘re being helped. 
Singer begins his argument with the following assumption, namely ―that suffering and death 
from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.‖120 This may seem like a fairly 
uncontroversial statement, and few may feel inclined to disagree. He then goes on to add and 
briefly explain another principle: 
―[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything 
of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. By ―without sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance‖ I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or 
doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in 
significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the 
last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and to promote what is good, and it requires this of 
us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, 
comparably important.‖121 
As Singer points out, this principle – ―if it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it‖ – should appear fairly uncontroversial. The principle can be illustrated by 
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the following example
122
: a man walks past a shallow pond in which a child is drowning. By 
wading in to save the child, the man‘s clothes would get muddy. After saving the child he 
would then have to get the clothes cleaned, perhaps paying a professional business to have 
them cleaned for him if he happened to be wearing a suit and tie. Getting his suit cleaned 
would then take both time and money. In worst case scenario, the man‘s clothes might be a 
lost cause, and he would have to throw the clothes away and spend more time and money on 
purchasing new clothes. Ought he to save the child? 
The answer, according to Singer, would be yes. The man‘s clothes, time, and money, are not 
of comparable moral importance to the child‘s life. Or to phrase it differently, while the man‘s 
clothes getting muddied might be bad, it wouldn‘t be as bad as the child dying by drowning, 
at least morally speaking. Ergo, the man should save the child, sacrificing his clean clothes. 
This is what follows from the above principle, and presumably no one but a few would 
disagree with this conclusion.  
However, the principle does not discriminate based on geography; it does not matter whether 
the child that is in danger of dying is close to us or not if we are actually able to help the child. 
This fact has great consequences as to how we ought to live our lives, and how we ought to 
invest our resources. As Singer writes: 
―The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in 
its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed. For the 
principle takes [...] no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the 
person I can help is a neighbor‘s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, 
ten thousand miles away. [...] I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take 
proximity and distance into account. The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have 
personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that 
we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.‖123 
To help clarify further, if a child is drowning in another part of the world, we would normally 
not be able to help the child quite as easily as we would in the example given above. But 
imagine instead that there is a starving child in a far away country – perhaps in Bengal, as 
Singer uses as his example. There are various famine relief organizations, and by donating to 
such an organization we could actually save a child from dying by starvation. Instead of 
buying fancy and expensive clothes and related accessories, or indulging in other luxuries, we 
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could instead donate the surplus money to such an organization to save a child from dying. In 
fact, we not only could do so, but we ought morally to do so and not doing so would be 
morally wrong. Donating to charities that help fight against starvation globally, Singer 
suggests, is not a charitable act as it‘s normally considered being, but rather it is the act that 
morality clearly demands of us, unless we somehow deem such luxuries of a higher moral 
importance than a human life: 
―When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look ―well-dressed‖ we are not providing 
for any important need. We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear 
our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another 
person from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather 
than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. 
[…] On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.‖124 
But how much ought we to give? If we are to follow Singer‘s principle, given the amount of 
starvation and suffering that exists in the world, he suggests ―that we ought to give until we 
reach the level of marginal utility – that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause 
as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.‖125 This would 
mean that we ought, morally, to devote most of our resources to help fight against poverty and 
famine globally, which would mean leading quite different lives than most of us in the 
western world are currently leading. Could we really justify going to the movies, purchasing 
Rolex wristwatches, or going on vacations, when this money instead could be used on saving 
human lives? 
There are a couple of thoughts and distinctions that I feel may be worth adding to what‘s been 
said above. One may, for example, question the utility of helping a poor nation and its 
suffering citizens by donating to famine relief. Perhaps the government of the nation suffering 
from famine would start relying too heavily on foreign aid, and in effect would not work 
towards fixing the more fundamental problems their nation may have which could help 
eradicate the need for such aid at all. This may be true, but it does not mean that we should 
not devote time and resources to fight against famine. Rather it would mean that we ought to 
devote our time and resources in a different way, and presumably there are organizations out 
there which focus more on strengthening a country‘s economy and infrastructure, in short 
seeking to make it more ‗developed‘ and independent, rather than directly assisting the 
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affected citizens. Singer seems to have the direct aid type of charity in mind in this text, in 
particular mentioning the Bengal Relief Fund which, if we donate to it, ―provide food, shelter, 
and medical care‖126, but he would presumably agree that this is not the only aid we ought to 
give; immediate and direct relief of suffering is important, but it is equally important to help 
prevent the longevity of the situation that causes the suffering and future suffering. 
As we know, according to utilitarianism the right act in any situation is that which would lead 
to the most happiness and the least pain – or the most preferences satisfied, from a preference 
utilitarian viewpoint. The action we are then morally obligated to do in any situation is that 
which would bring about the most happiness, and the action that would bring about the most 
pain would be the morally worst alternative. But in between these two extremes there are a 
myriad of possible actions; rarely in any situation do we simply have two acts to choose from, 
and knowing exactly which action would be the best from a utilitarian perspective could be a 
difficult task. Acting morally right thus becomes very difficult, if all actions that are not the 
best action in terms of promoting happiness are morally wrong. Perhaps we ought to look at 
utilitarian morality more like shades of gray, and what we ought to do is to choose the lightest 
shade, and try to be more charitable in our vocabulary when judging others – not saying that 
their action is wrong, and condemning them, but rather saying that their action is good, 
though not as good as another alternative action they could have gone with. 
Take the infamous example from William Godwin which we used in the previous chapter, 
having to choose between saving the Archbishop Fénelon or (let‘s say) our mother from a 
burning building. According to utilitarianism, we ought to save the Archbishop. But would we 
say that it would be wrong to save our mother? Strictly speaking, this seems to be the case 
from a utilitarian perspective. But it would not be as wrong as, say, saving neither – nor 
would it have been as good as preventing the fire in the first place, if we had the option. Thus 
saying that either action is the right and the wrong action may be to oversimplify the 
utilitarian theory, and we might be charitable enough to say that saving our mother was 
actually a good action (although not the best) – which consequently might make 
utilitarianism, and Godwin‘s example, less offensive to our intuitions. It seems then that we 
may also say that it‘s a good action to give to famine relief, regardless of how much you give, 
and to not say that every such small donation is actually a wrong action, as the only right 
action is to give until we reach the level of marginal utility.  
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And finally, one may perhaps argue that those who are closer to us actually have, for some 
reason, a stronger right to our help; that we ought to help someone closer to us rather than 
someone who is further away. But even if one were to agree to this, this does not necessarily 
mean that one shouldn‘t give up various luxuries and give to those in foreign countries, for 
example buying an expensive wristwatch instead of donating the money to a charity 
organization. It would merely mean that we ought to help those who are closer to us first, for 
example helping the poor and starving in our own and in our neighbouring countries, and then 
help those in more distant countries, which would still mean giving up expensive 
wristwatches.  
So here we have seen a good example of the top-down methodology in action: Singer starts 
with a particular moral principle which seems plausible if not actually self-evident, and he 
works his way down from it (pointing out what it does or does not imply – for example, 
arguing that proximity is not a relevant factor, but never changing the actual principle while 
doing so), deducing from this principle what we ought to do, what is right and wrong, in more 
specific cases. If the conclusions arrived at clash with our everyday moral judgments and 
intuitions, that does not prove the principle wrong. The principle in this case was ―if it is in 
our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it‖ (which seems fully compatible 
with the core utilitarian principle), and the consequence would be to give up all luxuries. The 
principle itself is never changed during the argument; it‘s neither discarded nor revised. The 
argument only helps to clarify the principle, and its practical implications and applications. As 
Singer writes:  
―the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion. My conclusion 
follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless that principle is rejected, or the 
arguments are shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must stand, however strange it appears.‖127 
 
INTUITIONS AS INVALUABLE TOOLS 
Recall the example that Jonathan Haidt presented to research participants when doing his 
research: the siblings Julie and Mark who one night decided to make love. Most judge their 
act of lovemaking to be wrong, and if we are to believe Haidt‘s research, this is done on the 
basis of an intuition. But according to the utilitarian principle, if the description is as Haidt 
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has presented it without any other relevant external factors, it would however seem to be the 
right thing to do, contrary to our intuition. 
Yet this intuition has arguably served mankind well through our history. It is common 
knowledge that there is a higher risk of birthing a child with various deformities when the 
child‘s parents are closely related to one another. So if not for our intuitive disgust against 
sexual relations among family members, presumably a higher number of deformed, unhealthy 
children would be born as more people would engage in lovemaking with one another within 
the family. The lives of these children would be more likely to be shorter, more painful, and 
less pleasurable than that of healthy children. Perhaps the lives of some of these deformed 
children would overall be more painful than happy. It would then be better to copulate outside 
the family, and give birth to healthy children instead, if the two available options are to give 
birth to a healthy child contra an unhealthy and deformed child. 
These days there are various aids that can be used to prevent conception during sex. If the 
story Haidt describes had taken place earlier in mankind‘s history, Julie and Mark would not 
have had access to such aids, and the chance of birthing a deformed child would be higher, 
and the contraception available may be more hazardous to their health. But with today‘s 
advances it is fully possible for close family members to have sex without a high chance of 
conception, and there would not be any risks to their health involved in using contraception. 
So it could perhaps be argued that this particular intuition has outplayed its usefulness, and is 
now doing more harm than good, making it difficult for family members who wish to live as 
spouses and engage in sex to lead the lives that would make them happy rather than sparing 
them and possible children from harm. 
In our everyday lives, we rarely have the resources to actually sit down and think through 
whether or not a certain action we do is moral or immoral. Instead, we rely on our everyday 
instincts and moral intuitions to quickly give us this information. And as it turns out, many – 
perhaps the majority – of these appear to be at least roughly in sync with what most moral 
theories would recommend. Presumably most of us feel that wanton acts of violence are 
wrong, and would neither want to be the victims of perpetrators of such acts, nor would we 
want others to fill these roles. We would be hard pressed to find any normative theory that 
would condone wanton violence. If we see someone coming at us with a knife, our response 
would probably be to run, trying to preserve our own lives. This would probably be the 
recommended response by any moral theory as well (in the absence of other relevant factors). 
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We do a number of more everyday actions without much thought; we feed our children, we 
perform our jobs, we engage in recreational activities, now and then we might help out friends 
or family members in larger tasks such as moving, etc.  
If on the other hand we were all to sit down and deliberately think about every action and 
every judgment we were to make, using our ability to reason to find out whether or not 
something actually is right and appealing to some moral principle, then the man with the knife 
may have kill us before we‘ve found the answer. Our children would grow hungry, furniture 
would go unmoved, jobs would go undone.  In short, if we were all to do this, the world 
would stop. We would be unable to function in our everyday lives. 
Not using intuitions and solely using reason would then be an unreasonable proposition. 
Instead, we should let ourselves be guided by our intuitions for the most part, but when we are 
capable we should try to reflect critically over our intuitions, and see whether or not they 
actually are right. In short, we should aspire for something akin to utilitarian philosopher R. 
M. Hare‘s two-level morality, separating between the intuitive, everyday level of morality, 
and the critical level.
128
 If upon reflection we find that some of our intuitions turn out to be 
wrong, we should ignore it, or better yet, strive to change it. 
We should then seek to develop in ourselves (and in others) the intuitions which most closely 
mirror normative, rationally based morality. For example, our intuition about the wrongness 
of incest, causing us to condemn what Julie and Mark did, was showed to have once been an 
intuition that was beneficial for us. Now, however, this intuition has outplayed its usefulness, 
and we should work to rid ourselves of it. 
Another example of an intuition that may not be too uncommon, is some people‘s intuitive 
disgust with open displays of homosexuality, finding this to be immoral. I believe I can state, 
without too much disagreement, that there is nothing immoral about homosexuality – and just 
as there is nothing wrong with heterosexual couples showing displays of affection in public 
(such as holding hands, hugging, and perhaps kissing), there is nothing wrong with 
homosexual couples doing the same. If anyone feels disgust at the thought or sight of 
homosexual affection, it could be suggested that he, ironically, ought to expose himself to it 
more in an attempt to make his response of disgust numb. Just as someone who works in a 
slaughterhouse with slaughtering animals might learn to feel no disgust at seeing blood, gore, 
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and even taking the lives of animals, frequenting a gay bars might gradually cure someone‘s 
disgust with homosexual affection. 
Of course, this isn‘t as easy with other moral intuitions we have in regards to other cases – 
such as capital punishment and abortion – but for some, simply exposing ourselves to the 
right stimuli might prove successful. But sometimes our intuitions may be of such a nature 
that the best we can do is to remind ourselves that they are mistaken and try to ignore them. 
 
REASON AS AN INVALUABLE TOOL 
So intuitions are invaluable tools in our everyday lives, making it possible for us to make 
quick decisions and judgments in regards to our own and others‘ actions without going 
through a time consuming, debilitating (and potentially dangerous, depending on the 
situation)  process each time we are faced with a situation. Intuitions are arguably also 
biologically unavoidable, a part of how we work and not something we can easily (if at all) 
get rid of. Yet these intuitions do not prove that something is right and wrong, for which we 
must ultimately put our ability to reason to work. 
The ability to reason is morally important, allowing us to find out what is morally right from 
wrong. One obvious way in which reasoning and critical thinking could be promoted, could 
be through obligatory classes in either critical thinking or philosophy. As Singer points out, 
most people ―know less about philosophy than they know about almost any other academic 
discipline.‖129 As we saw in chapter 3 when looking at the research conducted by Jonathan 
Haidt, philosophers were far more likely to ignore their intuitive responses on moral issues 
than non-philosophers, relying instead on their ability to reason to reach a judgment; 
philosophers were described as ―one of the few groups that has been found to reason well‖130, 
so a philosopher might be able to ―simply reason her way to a judgment that contradicts her 
initial intuition‖131. Thus teaching and exposing more people to philosophy seems like an 
obvious and easy way in which society can be made more moral. 
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Especially people holding important offices facing tough decisions on a regular basis which 
may affect the lives of many should be capable of ignoring gut reactions and instead think 
rationally and critically about important subjects before making any decisions. Presumably 
they should also be using the top-down method, as should most others. 
 
PHILOSOPHERS AS MORAL AUTHORITIES, AND THE „DANGER‟ OF 
PATERNALISM 
As has been stated, philosophers are skilled at thinking critically and ignoring their intuitions 
– much so than the non-philosopher. This should come as no surprise to Singer, who‘s argued 
that philosophers are well suited to provide insight into issues of morality, and to act as moral 
authorities – specifically in ―Moral Experts‖, published in 1972, and in ―Philosophers Are 
Back On The Job‖, published 1974. Singer writes that:  ―[I]t would be surprising if moral 
philosophers were not, in general, better suited to arrive at the right, or soundly based, moral 
conclusions than non-philosophers. Indeed, if this were not the case, one might wonder 
whether moral philosophy was worthwhile.‖132 At more length, he explains exactly why 
philosophers are more apt at contributing to discussions of right and wrong than non-
philosophers:  
―On the basis of what has just been said, it would seem that the moral philosopher does have some 
important advantage over the ordinary man. First, his general training as a philosopher should make him 
more than ordinarily competent in argument and in the detection of invalid inferences. Next, his specific 
experience in moral philosophy gives him an understanding of moral concepts and of the logic of moral 
argument. The possibility of serious confusion arising if one engages in moral argument without a clear 
understanding of the concepts employed has been sufficiently emphasized in recent moral philosophy 
and does not need to be demonstrated here. […] Finally, there is the simple fact that the moral 
philosopher can, if he wants, think full-time about moral issues, while most other people have some 
occupation to pursue which interferes with such reflection. It may sound silly to place much weight on 
this, but it is, I think very important. If we are to make moral judgments on some basis other than our 
unreflective intuitions, we need time, both for collecting facts and for thinking about them.‖ 
Thus Singer has high hopes for the role of philosophers in public debates on moral issues: 
―By using their understanding of the nature of moral concepts and, above all, by probing more 
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deeply and taking less for granted than others do, philosophers may be able to raise the 
standard of moral discussion from its present depressingly low level.‖133 
In light of the research and Singer‘s views on intuitions, there seems to be a certain danger 
here of paternalism or ethical elitism. Philosophers seem to know what is morally right better 
than anyone else, being capable of ignoring their moral intuitions better than others (and using 
the top-down method). If we also recognize morality as being the most important deciding 
factor for how a nation is run or society is shaped, as opposed to economic and aesthetic 
concerns, should not those who know best what is morally right and wrong be the ones 
making the shots, so to speak? Perhaps philosophers should be given free reins to implement 
their ethical views on the masses (though getting them to agree could be difficult), deciding 
various policies, and, in short, trying to create the most ethical society that they‘d be capable 
of. In short, should we not have some kinds of philosopher kings running the show? 
I believe there is nothing wrong with paternalism in and of itself – it just depends on who the 
father figure is, so to speak. If we define paternalism as the most suited running things to the 
greatest interests of all, there seems to be no danger in having a paternalistic society 
controlled by philosopher kings. However, actually trying to apply paternalism may have its 
share of problems, one of which might be the outrage of the people over having reduced 
freedom and their lives controlled. So perhaps rather than outright paternalism, some sort of 
esoteric morality might be the better option. 
 
ESOTERIC MORALITY 
The concept of esoteric morality was made famous in The Methods Of Ethics by Henry 
Sidgwick in this oft-quoted passage:  
―[O]n Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain 
circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set 
of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done 
with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to do in the face of the world; and even, if perfect 
secrecy can be reasonably expected, what it would be wrong to recommend by private advice or 
example.‖134 
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Esoteric morality is a complex concept, but for our present purposes it can be stated as the 
following: it may, under certain conditions, be morally right for those who know what is 
morally right to not say what is morally right to those who do not know. In fact, those who 
know what is morally right may be morally obligated to deceive those who don‘t as to what is 
morally right; they may deceive them as to what moral principles are correct, and as to what 
the morally recommended action would be in certain cases. Certain actions may also be 
morally obligated only insofar as the actions committed are kept secret; that is, as long as they 
are never made public. 
Esoteric morality is the topic in an as of yet unpublished manuscript co-authored by 
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer, entitled ―Secrecy In Consequentialism: A 
Defence Of Esoteric Morality‖. Here Singer breaks up and analyzes the above quoted 
paragraph from Sidgwick, using hypothetical scenarios to try to make clear what the notion of 
esoteric morality entails. He argues against philosophers John Rawls, Bertrand Gert, and Brad 
Hooker, all whom he claims believe that ―the fact that something would be wrong if it were 
done openly shows that it is wrong, even if done in secret.‖135  
To more clearly illustrate esoteric morality, we can look at an infamous hypothetical case in 
moral philosophy which Singer discusses in the manuscript; ―a surgeon has to do a delicate 
brain operation on a patient who happens to be the ideal organ donor for four other patients in 
the hospital, each of whom will die shortly unless they receive, respectively, a heart, a liver, 
and – for two of them – a kidney.‖136 From a utilitarian standpoint, the surgeon ought to, 
ceteris paribus, bring about the death of the one patient to save the lives of the four other 
patients. But, Singer writes, ―this is one of those rare cases in which the action is right only if 
perfect secrecy can be expected.‖137 For if it became publically known, there would 
presumably be public outrage. People may no longer feel as if they could trust doctors, fearing 
that the doctors could harvest their organs instead of curing them. So this action is only right 
insofar as it is kept from the public‘s eyes. 
Moral philosophers, as has been stated, have had rigorous training in doing normative ethics, 
and are better at making moral judgments based on reason as opposed to intuitions than 
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others. I suggested that this might mean that philosophers really ought to ‗run the show‘, 
making our society into the most ethical society without outside inference – in a short, a form 
of paternalism. But just as people would find doctors redistributing organs among their 
patients appalling, people might find such a paternalistic society outrageous as well. So 
perhaps philosophers should try to spread morality, but doing so without the public knowing?  
For example, let‘s say philosophers agree that active euthanasia is morally okay, but the 
public finds this intuitively appalling. So if active euthanasia were to be accepted, public 
outrage would ensue. So perhaps the intuitions of the public ought to be manipulated 
discretely, through propaganda or more calculated means, so that they‘ll gradually come to 
accept active euthanasia. Once the intuitions of the bulk of the public have been sufficiently 
tampered with, euthanasia could be endorsed and practised publically (and until then, it could 
only be practised in private). 
If we are cynical, we might perhaps claim that Singer himself practices a kind of esoteric 
morality, trying to disguise his arguments so as to not trigger the wrong intuitions in people. 
Though Singer believes in the utilitarian principle, he often argues without actually referring 
to utilitarianism directly, despite the fact that his arguments have their roots in said theory. 
Utilitarianism is well-known as clashing with many of our common intuitions. Consequently, 
by not making explicit the utilitarian roots, he may avoid triggering certain intuitions in 
people, which in turn would lead them to discard his argument; instead people may find 
themselves persuaded to utilitarianism without really knowing it. 
A better, less cynical explanation is simply that he does not wish to exclude anyone from the 
debate on various moral issues. As non-philosophers are not familiar with the terminology of 
academic philosophy, they may find it discouraging and intimidating, and as we shall be 
commenting below, open, public discussions of moral issues may be important. Perhaps also 
the utilitarian specific methodology often remains unused in an effort to show that proposed 
principles and actions would be accepted by other, non-utilitarian theories as well. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF TALKING ETHICS IN PUBLIC 
As a counterpoint to the possibility of elitism, paternalism, and esoteric morally – which may 
be more academic fiction than any real, practical dangers – the preceding chapters can instead 
give us some good arguments for having frequent and open debates about morality and moral 
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issues, and for teaching ethics to others. This clearly seems to be what Singer would want, as 
he writes: 
―This suggestion [that moral philosophers are moral experts] is not meant to imply that moral 
philosophers should pontificate from their professorial chairs while the masses dutifully obey. Moral 
positions should be discussed and argued about, not accepted on the authority of God or god-
professor.‖138 
(Although he does also admit: ―We should be reluctant to embrace esoteric morality. Yet 
sometimes we are right to do in secret what it would be wrong to do, or to advocate, in 
public.‖139) 
It is through discussions with others, and through conflicts, in which our moral views are 
often tested. Philosophers have the luxury of being ―tested by his colleagues at seminars, 
conferences, and in the learned journals‖140 on his various claims, as we mentioned above, but 
by more frequently having open, accessible, public debates, non-philosophers may be able to 
both contribute and to have their views tested – through newspapers, TV shows, and open 
academic seminars. 
Jonathan Haidt also speculates in the importance of discussing ethics with others, saying that 
more open discussions about moral matters may lead to personal judgments that are ―nuanced 
and ultimately more reasonable.‖141 People may at times be morally dumbfounded as a result, 
holding their views without being able to give any good justification for their views, but 
hopefully this sort of dumbfounding is at least one step closer to having changed someone‘s 
mind, perhaps causing them to further reflect on their own intuitively based judgments. To 
refer to Haidt‘s SIM, arguing about ethics and occasionally becoming dumbfounded it might 
help strengthen the reasoned judgment and private reflection links. 
People may often find it uncomfortable to discuss their own views on morality though, 
believing that it is a personal matter, and not feeling comfortable with discussing sensitive 
issues close to one‘s heart. But this seems to be a dangerous stance, allowing opinions which 
are plainly immoral to remain uncontested. Especially in a democratic society does this seem 
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especially appalling, as everyone have the power to shape society and, thusly, control 
everyone else‘s lives. Singer points out this curious attitude in his book Rethinking Life And 
Death: 
―There is a common view that reason and argument play no role in ethics, and therefore we have no 
need to defend our ethical views when they are challenged. Some people are more ready to reason about 
the merits of football players or chocolate cake recipes than they are about their belief in the sanctity of 
human life. This is a force of conservatism in ethics. It allows people to say: ‗Oh yes, well that is your 
opinion, but I think differently‘ – as if that is the end of discussion.‖142 
If we do not have open, public discussions of moral issues, there would be little (if any) moral 
progress, people simply left to stagnate with their own moral standards. Then it would maybe 
be for the better to let the philosophers run the show. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We started this thesis by looking at Peter Singer‘s argument against the use of intuitions 
which we called the subjectivism argument, claiming that using intuitions as data against 
which to test our moral theories would lead to us to be subjectivists. We did not find any fatal 
errors with the argument per se, but there were uncertainties as to what the concepts of 
subjectivity and objectivity referred to, and further clarification of these terms from Singer‘s 
side might be needed for his argument be persuasive. We looked at John Rawls‘s method of 
reflective equilibrium, which Singer was obviously against, yet we found some similarities 
and overlaps between Rawls‘s method and that of Singer, and perhaps throughout the paper. 
We also looked at Henry Sidgwick‘s methodology, which involved finding self-evident first 
principles which would serve as moral axioms. How these first-principles were to be justified 
seemed to be a problem, as the only way they could be justified was by their self-evidence – 
in other words, their lack of a need to be justified. 
Then we proceeded to look at the evolution argument, a later argument that Singer uses 
against moral intuitions. He based his argument on the research done in the field of moral 
psychology by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt (and their colleagues), claiming that our 
intuitions had been shaped by the process of evolution and were therefore morally irrelevant. 
The research also generally helped drive a wedge between moral judgments based on reason 
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contra intuitions, making them into two distinct, separable phenomena. The evolution 
argument was found lacking, as Singer never seemed to give a satisfying answer as to why the 
evolutionary origins of our intuitions would render them normatively impotent. We asked, 
what if our intuitions had had a different origin, such as a deity or a demon? Would this have 
made the moral intuitions more or less valid? The suggested answer was that their origins 
would not directly affect their normative status, or lack thereof. Singer also showed that he 
wasn‘t as anti-intuitionist as one might have believed, introducing the notion of rational 
intuitions, which seemed to be a similar concept as self-evidence. 
Then we went on to try to sketch our own argument against the use of moral intuitions, the 
partiality argument. It was claimed that Singer himself had come close to making this 
argument, but that he had never actually done so. Impartiality was roughly defined as taking 
on a perspective in which you remove yourself from yourself, whereas partiality was doing 
the opposite, taking on the perspective as yourself in your particular situation. It was 
suggested that intuitions only helped entrench us in ourselves, and hence would be considered 
immoral as a source of justification for normative ethics. The findings of Jean Piaget on 
egocentrism in children referred to as a possible source of credibility for the argument. 
And finally, in this chapter we tried to make a few practical deductions and lose speculations 
from what has come in the preceding chapters, seeing how we are to engage in ethics as well 
as how we are to make our society into a more ethical one. We described Singer‘s 
methodology, a top-down approach to doing ethics, basically the same method as that of 
Sidgwick, and we saw how it worked in practice by looking at the issue of poverty and 
foreign aid. We then suggested that intuitions did not have to be the foe of normative ethics, 
but could rather serve as a valuable ally, and that we ought to try to shape our intuitions, as 
best we can, to be in sync with some recognized moral principles. Without intuitions humans 
would cease to function effectively. Reasoning is undoubtedly still important as well, as this 
is what ultimately allows us to find out what‘s really moral and in so doing, assessing our 
intuitions. Education in philosophy and frequent, open, debates on moral issues may help to 
improve our ability to reason, as well as allowing us to test our own views. However, this 
strong emphasis on reason and the moral expertise of philosophers could be used as an 
argument for paternalism or esoteric morality. 
Have we reached our asserted goal, of identifying and explaining Singer‘s arguments against 
the use of intuitions in moral methodology? Somewhat. They were identified and discussed to 
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the best ability of the author of this thesis (given various factors), but in the end we were left 
with several new questions which were never fully answered. Just exactly what is meant by 
subjectivism and objectivism? Is evolution really normatively relevant? How can we actually 
find first-principles, and why do so many moral philosophers disagree if such principles exist 
and really are self-evident? And can we, ultimately, trust the actual moral intuitions we have? 
In Singer‘s comment to Cass R. Sunstein‘s text ―Moral Heuristics‖, Singer makes the 
following claim, referring to the debate about moral intuitions: ―Debate in normative ethical 
theory will continue. Perhaps, however, one chapter is drawing to a close.‖143 But I believe 
Singer is premature in his prediction; instead I predict that the work here has just started, 
especially with the advances within the field of moral psychology. Volumes have been written 
and many more will be written on the topic of moral intuitions, both for and against. 
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